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“COMPLEXITY” AS THE GATEKEEPER TO EQUITABLE 
MOOTNESS  
ABSTRACT 
When confronted with appeals from chapter 11 plan confirmation orders, 
appellate courts face a delicate balancing of interests. On the one hand, a 
court must consider the interests of the reorganized debtor and innocent third 
parties that relied on the order. On the other hand, the court must consider a 
claim or interest holder that feels the plan treated them unfairly. These jilted 
parties often want the plan undone to accommodate their interests. By the time 
an appellate court finally hears an appeal, however, the reorganized entity 
often has already entered into various transactions—e.g., closed stores, 
contracted with vendors, issued publicly traded securities, or merged into a 
different entity. Unwinding the plan at such a late date is no longer feasible 
because a court cannot “unscramble the egg.”  
Appellate courts created the doctrine of equitable mootness for this 
situation. The underlying basis for the doctrine is the reliance of innocent third 
parties on the finality of the plan confirmation order. Despite equitable 
mootness’s express limitation to “complex reorganizations,” courts have 
bastardized the doctrine. Courts have found appeals from relatively simple 
reorganization, liquidation, and chapter 9 plans equitably moot. Recent 
criticisms have centered on the doctrine’s appropriateness in light of 
constitutional, efficacy, and statutory challenges. These attacks, however, 
ultimately stemmed from equitable mootness’s misapplication.  
This Comment will argue that when a party asserts an appeal is equitably 
moot, appellate courts must formally determine whether a complex 
reorganization occurred as a threshold matter. If a court concludes a complex 
reorganization occurred, only then should it proceed to an equitable mootness 
analysis. Through a four-part test, courts can keep this super-finality doctrine 
the exception, not the rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The goal of a chapter 11 case is to achieve the debtor’s financial 
reorganization that will avoid the need for further bankruptcy relief in the 
future.1 Bankruptcy courts attempt to accomplish this goal by moving the 
chapter 11 debtor through bankruptcy with “speed . . . consistent with [the] 
orderly and efficient administration of the case.”2 Failing to reorganize and 
rehabilitate results in liquidation, meaning a loss of jobs and “potential misuse 
of economic resources.”3 
The speed and efficiency of the system is evident when looking at chapter 
11 emergences of large, publicly traded companies with assets over $100 
million. In 2007 and 2008, in the midst of the economic crisis, these 
companies, respectively, spent an average of 691 and 447 days in bankruptcy.4 
For chapter 11 debtors that filed for relief in 2016, the average number of days 
spent “in bankruptcy” has decreased to 158.5 Minimizing the time that chapter 
11 debtors spend in bankruptcy is vital because bankruptcy inhibits a 
business’s ability to operate normally. As the Third Circuit explained in 
Tribune Media Co. v. Aurelius Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Tribune Media Co.), 
each day a business spends in bankruptcy is “a day when it will have a hard 
time attracting the investors, employees, and, in some industries, customers 
that it needs to exist and prosper.”6 
The bankruptcy appellate process not only reflects an emphasis on speed,7 
but it also reflects another goal of bankruptcy: the finality of confirmation 
orders.8 This principle facilitates a debtor’s chance at successful reorganization 
 
 1 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & Prac. § 91:9 (3d ed. 
2015), Westlaw, 5 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d § 91:9. 
 2 1–6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 6.11 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) 
[hereinafter COLLIER (16th ed.)]; see also Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate 
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529 (1983) (identifying speed as one of “three principal 
characteristics desirable for a reorganization mechanism”). 
 3 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). 
 4 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Year Emerged–Study Summary, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH 
DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/design_a_study.asp?OutputVariable=YearEmerged (last visited Aug. 
27, 2016). 
 5 Id. 
 6 799 F.3d 272, 289 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016). 
 7 See Lindsey Freeman, Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals: The Impact of Procedural 
Uncertainty on Predictable Precedent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 543, 546 (2011). 
 8 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 561 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting the “strong public interest in the 
finality of bankruptcy reorganizations”). 
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by “fostering confidence in the finality of confirmed plans,”9 which encourages 
investors and other third parties to rely on confirmation orders.10 It also helps 
serve the two underlying policies of chapter 11: (1) preserving the business as 
a going concern; and (2) maximizing property available to satisfy creditors.11 
Appellate courts face a difficult task, however, with appeals from 
confirmation orders. They have to “strik[e] the proper balance between the 
equitable considerations of finality and good faith reliance on a judgment and 
the competing interests that underlie the right of a party to seek review of a 
bankruptcy court order adversely affecting him.”12 
To balance these considerations, appellate courts fashioned and now 
employ the doctrine of equitable mootness for chapter 11 appeals.13 Courts 
developed this doctrine14 in the context of appeals from plan confirmation 
orders advanced by claim or interest holders that argue the plan treated them 
unfairly. The specific relief sought by an appellant varies from case to case.15 
Granting such relief often means that the court would have to unwind some, or 
even all, of the actions taken to implement the plan in an effort to return the 
estate to the status quo as it existed before the debtor’s plan was confirmed. In 
certain instances, however, courts determined that the debtor’s reorganization 
plan had been substantially consummated and was so complex that reversing 
the plan’s implementation would be impractical and inequitable.16 Rewinding 
 
 9 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 10 See id. 
 11 Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 435 (1999). 
 12 In re Club Assocs., 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 13 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 558–59. See generally Moot, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (“2. Having no practical significance; hypothetical or academic <the question on appeal became moot 
once the parties settled their case>.”); Mootness Doctrine, id. (“The principle that American courts will not 
decide moot cases—that is, cases in which there is no longer any actual controversy.”). It should be noted that 
a circuit split exists regarding whether equitable mootness applies to chapter 9. Compare Ochadleus v. City of 
Detroit (In re City of Detroit), Nos. 15-2194, et al., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17774 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 2016) 
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of an appeal by a group of pensioners from an order confirming 
Detroit’s chapter 9 plan), and Alexander v. Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 498 B.R. 550 (D.S.C. 2013) (finding the 
appeal was equitably moot), and Lionel v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 551 F. App’x 339 (9th Cir. 
2013) (holding the appeal was equitably moot), with Bennett v. Jefferson Cty., 518 B.R. 613 (N.D. Ala. 2014) 
(holding that equitable mootness does not apply to chapter 9 cases). 
 14 Throughout this Comment, the term “doctrine” will refer to equitable mootness. 
 15 Compare In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 561 (seeking payment from the reorganized debtor after the 
bankruptcy court rejected the appellant’s claim), with Varde Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Comair, Inc. (In re Delta Air 
Lines, Inc.), 386 B.R. 518, 531 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (seeking revocation of the confirmation order). 
 16 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (2012) (defining substantial consummation); Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l 
Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[A] reviewing court may decline to consider the 
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the clock would have a detrimental effect on third parties not related to the 
bankruptcy proceeding that relied on the plan. Courts found it no longer 
equitable to upset the plan of reorganization and therefore refused to consider 
the merits of the appeal.17 In these instances, “equitable considerations make it 
unfair . . . to intervene.”18 
The doctrine is “grounded in the notion that, with the passage of time after 
a judgment . . . effective relief on appeal becomes impracticable, imprudent, 
and therefore inequitable.”19 Courts and commentators have explained the 
problem with a useful, if unconventional, ovoid metaphor: asking the court to 
unscramble an egg.20 Asking courts to unwind certain chapter 11 plans is 
asking courts to undo what cannot feasibly be undone. It would be a waste of 
judicial resources, in such a situation, to consider each party’s arguments that 
actions taken under the plan should or should not be undone; the result will 
inevitably be the same—once “[t]he eggs are thoroughly scrambled,” there is 
nothing more that can be done.21 The merits of the appellant’s case are 
irrelevant; the appeal is equitably moot. 
Equitable mootness occupies an interesting space in bankruptcy law, an 
area driven by statutory interpretation.22 This judicially created doctrine seems 
to favor finality over appellate review for equitable or prudential reasons, for 
“it is one thing for a plan to be binding on the parties, and something else for it 
 
merits of a confirmation order when there has been substantial consummation of the plan such that effective 
judicial relief is no longer available . . . .”). 
 17 See 8B C. J. S. Bankruptcy § 1271 (2016). 
 18 See Duff v. Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, LLC, 801 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2015); see also In re UNR 
Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 19 Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp. (Mac Panel II), 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002); see also 
Almeroth v. Innovative Clinical Sols., Ltd. (In re Innovative Clinical Sols., Ltd.), 302 B.R. 136, 142 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2003) (quoting Chang v. Servico, Inc. (In re Servico, Inc.), 161 B.R. 297, 301 (S.D. Fla. 1993)) 
(“Confirmation plans eventually reach a point of completion where to reverse the confirmation order would be 
to ‘knock the props out from under the authorization of every action that has taken place’ under the plan.”). 
 20 Courts have also likened granting the relief an appellant seeks to repairing “Humpty Dumpty.” See In 
re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Rochman v. Northeast Utils. Serv. Group (In 
re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 963 F.2d 469, 475 (1st Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016); Mac Panel 
II, 283 F.3d at 626. 
 21 Brief for the Appellees at 2, In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d 272 (Nos. 14-3333, 14-3332), 2015 WL 
222905 at *2; cf. In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 769 (“[T]he reasons underlying §§ 363(m) and 1127(b)—
preserving interests bought and paid for in reliance on judicial decisions, and avoiding the pains that attend any 
effort to unscramble an egg—are so plain and so compelling that courts fill the interstices of the Code with the 
same approach.”). 
 22 See Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of 
Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2005), [hereinafter Ahart, The Limited 
Scope] (“[A] bankruptcy judge’s powers stem virtually exclusively from statutes.”). 
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to bind an appellate court tasked with reviewing its validity.”23 Equitable 
mootness is a powerful tool in an appellate court’s arsenal and raises 
constitutional, statutory, and efficacy issues in the bankruptcy appeals 
process.24  
Although appellate courts intended to apply the doctrine only to complex 
reorganizations involving intricate transactions, “with a scalpel rather than an 
axe,”25 they have not done so.26 This misapplication resulted in preventable 
appellate litigation involving relatively simple bankruptcies.27 Appellate courts 
limited and criticized the doctrine over the past several years to rein it back in 
from its misuse.28 
The doctrine’s controversy resulted in three decisions within ten weeks of 
each other: One2One Communications, LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc. (In re 
One2One Communications, LLC),29 In re Tribune Media Co.,30 and JPMCC 
 
 23 Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition at 6, In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (No. 15-891), 2016 WL 676009, at *6; see 
Alta. Energy Partners v. Blast Energy Servs., Inc. (In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc.), 593 F.3d 418, 424 (5th Cir. 
2010) (“Equitable mootness authorizes an appellate court to decline review of an otherwise viable appeal of a 
Chapter 11 reorganization plan, but only when the reorganization has progressed too far for the requested relief 
practicably to be granted.”). 
 24 See One2One Commc’ns, LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc. (In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC), 805 F.3d 
428, 438–48 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring). 
 25 Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 
229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009); see, e.g., Duff v. Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, LLC, 801 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2015); In 
re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 279 (Ambro, J., concurring) (“[W]e decline to disturb ‘complex transactions 
undertaken after the Plan was consummated’ that would be most difficult to unravel.”); Rev Op Grp. v. ML 
Manager, LLC (In re Mortgs. Ltd.), 771 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014); R<2> Inv., LDC v. Charter 
Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc.), 691 F.3d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 2012); SEC v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 733, 745–46 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“The doctrine also turns in part on whether the transactions at issue are complex and would be difficult 
to unwind.”). 
 26 See In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 439 (Krause, J., concurring). 
 27 See Bruce A. Markell, Equitable Cuteness: Of Mountains and Mice, BANKR. L. LETTER (Thomson 
Reuters, Saint Paul, Minn.), Nov. 2015, Westlaw, 35 No. 11 Bankruptcy Law Letter NL 1 (“They pressed 
equitable mootness in all cases, even ones that were small and simple. Their actions could be characterized as 
proceeding ‘[w]ith the thrust and lack of craft of a berserk sword; All lion, none of the fox.’”). 
 28 See Samson Energy Res. Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 728 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(narrowing acceptable uses of equitable mootness doctrine); In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(narrowing the scope of equitable mootness); see also Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 
180, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J., concurring); In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 567–69 (3d Cir. 
1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (questioning the doctrine’s basis in law, and whether the goal of furthering the 
Code was enough authority to refuse to entertain a viable appeal); In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 
1994) (“[W]e banish ‘equitable mootness’ from the (local) lexicon. We ask not whether the case is moot, 
‘equitably’ or otherwise, but whether it is prudent to upset the plan of reorganization at this late date.”). 
 29 805 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest Resort Properties (In re 
Transwest Resort Properties).31 Each appeal involved “efforts by plan 
proponents to dismiss potentially meritorious appeals on [equitable mootness] 
grounds.”32 Each decision, fascinating in its own right, is accompanied by 
impassioned, separate concurring or dissenting opinions providing alternative 
analyses of the equitable mootness concerns at issue in the case. These 
opinions, read together, illustrate the concerns that have called the doctrine’s 
legitimacy into question and the ongoing efforts to limit its scope.33 Despite 
these concerns, however, appellate courts have already articulated an 
applicable standard for equitable mootness: complex reorganizations. 
This Comment argues that to apply equitable mootness as intended, to 
complex reorganizations, appellate courts should be required to determine, as a 
threshold matter, whether a complex reorganization occurred. Only after a 
court finds that a complex reorganization occurred should it proceed to an 
equitable mootness analysis. Through a four-part analysis,34 “complexity” will 
serve as the gatekeeper to the doctrine. 
If appellate courts adopt this approach, they will eliminate the doctrine’s 
unwarranted application to the relatively simple appeals that courts should hear 
on their merits. Too much of the circuits’ current equitable mootness analyses 
focuses on when equitable mootness should apply; it is more effective to look 
at when it should not apply. 
This Comment proceeds as follows. First, this Comment will begin by 
providing a brief overview of the chapter 11 plan process and discuss the 
doctrine’s origin, along with its varying application in the circuits. Throughout 
this discussion, this Comment will highlight the lack of a “complexity” 
 
 30 799 F.3d 272 (3d. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016).  
 31 801 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 32 Markell, supra note 27; see In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 437–38 (holding that the appeal was not 
equitably moot because the reorganization was relatively simple); In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 282, 283–
84 (holding that the first creditor’s appeal was equitably moot because the relief sought required undoing a 
global settlement of a multi-billion dollar leveraged buyout litigation; but the second creditor’s appeal was not 
equitably moot because resolving a $30 million inter-creditor dispute between two different classes would not 
unscramble the plan); In re Transwest, 801 F.3d at 1173 (holding that although the plan was substantially 
consummated, the plan was not equitably moot because the third party investor was an active participant in the 
bankruptcy and therefore was not an unsuspecting third party and the court could fashion some nominal relief).  
 33 See, e.g., Markell, supra note 27; Randolph J. Haines, Ninth Circuit Eviscerates Equitable Mootness, 
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER (Thomson Reuters, Saint Paul, Minn.), Aug. 2015, Westlaw, 2015 No. 8 Norton 
Bankr. L. Adviser NL 1. 
 34 See infra Part II.D.  
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determination in the circuits’ various analyses. Next, this Comment will 
analyze the Third Circuit’s decision in In re One2One and will offer a positive 
list of factors that constitute a complex reorganization. Finally, this Comment 
will use these factors to provide a normative approach to “complexity” that 
will determine whether a complex reorganization occurred, thus warranting the 
doctrine’s analysis. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The chapter 11 plan process allows claim and interest holders to have a say 
in how they are treated in bankruptcy proceedings.35 Understanding this 
process is useful when considering how a claim or interest holder would think 
it had its rights trampled during the voting or confirmation processes. Appeals 
in bankruptcy cases are similar to appeals in civil cases, but they have an added 
emphasis on finality because “in bankruptcy proceedings, . . . finality is 
essential to the fashioning of effective remedies.”36 
Appellate courts fashioned equitable mootness to deal with this issue, 
which originates from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Trone v. Roberts Farms, 
Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.).37 Even though each circuit adopted equitable 
mootness after the decision in In re Roberts Farms, the circuits did not adopt a 
uniform application for the doctrine.38 The lack of uniformity contributed to 
equitable mootness’s misapplication.39 
A. Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation and the Bankruptcy Appeals Process 
Before a discussion of equitable mootness, a brief overview of the chapter 
11 plan confirmation process is helpful because it illustrates why a claim or 
interest holder may feel overshadowed during the voting or confirmation 
processes and appeal a confirmation order. 
 
 35 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2012); id. § 1129. 
 36 In re Chateaugay Corp. (Chateaugay I), 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 37 652 F.2d 793.  
 38 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 6–7. 
 39 See id. at 7. 
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1. Chapter 11 Plan Voting and Confirmation 
A debtor filing for chapter 11 protection may design a plan that outlines its 
emergence from bankruptcy.40 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 
(“Norton”) explains that “[t]he basic goal of a Chapter 11 case is to achieve the 
debtor’s financial reorganization that will avoid the need for further 
reorganization or debtor’s relief in the future.”41 The plan requirements under 
chapter 11 are stringent and comprehensive.42 Two Bankruptcy Code (the 
“Code”) provisions are particularly important for purposes of bankruptcy 
appeals: §§ 1126 and 1129.43 
Section 1126 specifies the voting procedures required for plan acceptance.44 
While claim or interest holders vote on the plan individually, classes as a 
whole accept or reject the plan.45 A class accepts a plan only if fifty percent of 
voting claim holders accept the plan and if these accepting claim holders 
possess at least two-thirds of the aggregate dollar amount of the voting claims 
in the class.46  
Once a plan passes the voting stage, the bankruptcy court holds a 
confirmation hearing.47 Section 1129 specifies the plan requirements necessary 
for a court to confirm a plan.48 Any party in interest can object to the plan at 
this hearing.49 A court will overrule this objection and confirm the plan as long 
as the plan meets the requirements of § 1129.50 Many of the § 1129 
 
 40 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a). 
 41 5 NORTON, JR. & NORTON III, supra note 1, § 91:9. 
 42 See generally Matthew D. Pechous, Comment, Walking the Tight Rope and Not the Plank: A Proposed 
Standard for Second-Level Appellate Review of Equitable Mootness Determinations, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
J. 547, 551–54 (2012) (outlining the specifics of the plan proposal and confirmation process). 
 43 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129. 
 44 Id. § 1126. 
 45 See id. § 1126(c)–(d); see also David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in 
Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 477 (1992) (“[T]he emphasis of section 1126 rests on 
whether the class as a whole votes for or against the plan.”). 
 46 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c); Pechous, supra note 42, at 552. 
 47 See 11 U.S.C. § 1128(a). 
 48 See id. § 1129. 
 49 See id. § 1128(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a); see also Curtis Lumber Co. v. La. Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762, 
771 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 17(a) requires that the plaintiff ‘actually possess, 
under the substantive law, the right sought to be enforced.’” (quoting United HealthCare Corp. v. Am. Trade 
Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir.1996)); BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Tex. Realty Holdings, LLC, 
901 F. Supp. 2d 884, 907 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“The real party in interest is the person with the right to sue under 
substantive law. . . .”). 
 50 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a); see also Pechous, supra note 42, at 553 (listing several of the requirements a 
plan must meet). 
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requirements are general and apply to all chapter 11 cases.51 If a debtor cannot 
obtain creditor consent, the debtor may seek confirmation by cramdown under 
§ 1129(b).52 Cramdown is exactly what it sounds like, as Norton succinctly 
explains: “[I]t permits the proponent (with the approval of the court) to rewrite 
the terms of the creditor’s contract, imposing terms that the court finds fit in 
lieu of terms negotiated by the parties.”53 
If the plan meets these requirements, the bankruptcy court will confirm the 
reorganization plan and grant the debtor a discharge from all pre-bankruptcy 
debts.54 The plan is essentially a new contract that binds “the debtor, any entity 
issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan, 
and any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor . . . .”55 
Sections 1126 and 1129 deserve the most attention when discussing 
bankruptcy appeals because they illustrate how an objecting creditor could 
have its objection overshadowed or crammed down against. Several reasons 
exist why a creditor would seek to appeal the confirmation order.56 A party 
may believe the plan lumped it together with a dissimilar claim to garner the 
requisite majorities under § 1126 or was crammed down while the plan 
proponent used an artificially impaired class to satisfy § 1129(a)(10).57 
Undervaluation of a bond or stock could deprive a claim or interest holder 
from recovering on its claim because of the cramdown process.58 The above 
examples illustrate why a dissenting claim or interest holder would believe the 
plan treated it unfairly and decide to appeal the confirmation order. 
2. The Bankruptcy Appeals Process 
A party in interest who has standing may appeal a confirmation order.59 
Only an aggrieved party—one who had a financial interest in the lower court’s 
 
 51 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3), (7), (10), (11). 
 52 Id. § 1129(b); 6 NORTON, JR. & NORTON III, supra note 1, § 113:1. 
 53 6 NORTON, JR. & NORTON III, supra note 1, § 113:1. 
 54 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). 
 55 Id. § 1141(a); accord 6 NORTON, JR. & NORTON III, supra note 1, § 114:1 (“A confirmed plan is a 
document that is legally binding upon all parties, including creditors, equity interest holders, debtors, and 
others within the court’s jurisdiction whether or not they consented to the plan.”). 
 56 E.g., Pechous, supra note 42, at 554 (illustrating reasons a party might appeal). 
 57 See, e.g., In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 238, 250–251 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 58 See, e.g., Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting 
interest holders appealed a $300 million valuation of debtor, claiming debtor was actually worth $1.05 billion). 
 59 See In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 1987); 1–5 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, 
¶ 5.07. 
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order—has standing to file an appeal.60 The standing requirement in 
bankruptcy appeals is more restrictive than traditional Constitutional (Article 
III) standing because the appellant must show that its interests were directly, 
adversely, and monetarily affected by the order from which it appeals.61 This 
party may seek a stay of the execution of the plan while it appeals,62 but courts 
rarely grant these motions.63 
Two first-level appellate courts may hear appeals from final judgments, 
orders, and decrees by bankruptcy judges: either the district court64 or a 
bankruptcy appellate panel if the circuit has established a one.65 A party can 
further appeal to the appropriate court of appeals and potentially to the 
Supreme Court.66 However, a party can only appeal as of right final judgments, 
orders, and decrees.67 
Appellate courts can take a long time to hear an appeal, however.68 For 
example, from June 30, 2015 to June 30 2016, the Fourth Circuit had the 
lowest “Median Time From Filing Notice of Appeal to Disposition,” at 4.4 
months.69 The Second and Third Circuits, where the majority of large, 
corporate bankruptcy filings occur, had respective median times of 11.1 and 
7.4 months.70 In the meantime, a debtor will begin to implement its 
 
 60 See, e.g., Di Ferrante v. Young (In re Young), 416 F. App’x 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2011); In re 
Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 214 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 61 See, e.g., In re Knight-Celotex, LLC, 695 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Bankruptcy standing is 
narrower than constitutional standing and requires that a person ‘have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of 
the bankruptcy proceedings.’” (quoting Cult Awareness Network, Inc. v. Martino (In re Cult Awareness 
Network, Inc.), 151 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1998))); Spenlinhauer v. O’Donnell, 261 F.3d 113, 117–18 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (stating that for appellant to qualify as “person aggrieved” with standing to appeal bankruptcy court 
order, challenged order must directly and adversely affect appellant’s pecuniary interests). 
 62 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007. 
 63 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 8–9 (“Obtaining such a stay, however, is typically a daunting task, and 
most efforts to do so are not successful.”). 
 64 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).  
 65 See id. § 158(b)–(c). The First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have established bankruptcy 
appellate panels. 6 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 117.02[2], n.25 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 2015), LEXIS, 6–117 Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide P 117.02 (2015). See generally 
Pechous, supra note 42, at 554–57 (outlining the specifics on the bankruptcy appeals process). 
 66 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d); id. § 1254. 
 67 See id. § 158(a)(1). See generally Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1691–94 (2015). 
 68  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT 
STATISTICS: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS SUMMARY 2 (2016).  
 69 Id.  
 70 Id. 
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reorganization plan. Of primary consideration in bankruptcy appeals is the 
need for finality.71 From this need, equitable mootness developed.72 
B. In re Roberts Farms: The Foundation for the Modern Equitable Mootness 
Doctrine 
The Ninth Circuit laid the foundation for the modern doctrine in In re 
Roberts Farms.73 In that case, a creditor, Trone, appealed orders from the 
bankruptcy court disallowing its claims, approving a settlement, and 
confirming a reorganization plan.74 In the district court, the appellees moved to 
dismiss the case as moot, and the district court granted the motion.75 Trone 
appealed further.76 The Ninth Circuit determined the only issue was the 
correctness of the mootness ruling.77 
The Ninth Circuit found the appeal moot because the court could not 
feasibly undo the transactions that occurred under the plan.78 The court 
explained that the plan contained “many intricate and involved transactions.”79 
Consummation of these transactions caused “such a comprehensive change of 
circumstances to occur as to render it . . . inequitable to consider the merits of 
the appeal.”80 The court therefore dismissed the appeal as moot.81 
Besides laying the foundation for the modern equitable mootness doctrine, 
In re Roberts Farms is significant for its emphasis on “intricate and involved 
transactions.”82 As early as the first application of mootness with equity 
considerations, the court was concerned with the complexity of the 
 
 71 See Chateaugay I, 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 72 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 10. 
 73 652 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1981).  
 74 Id. at 794–95.  
 75 Id. at 795.  
 76 See id.  
 77 See id. at 796. 
 78 See id. at 798. 
 79 Id. at 797. Under the plan, the debtor made payments in full of all allowed general unsecured claims 
plus 7% interest per year from the date of the debtor’s original filing to date of payment in full and in cash 
immediately on the effective date of the plan. Id. at 794. The plan also required the debtor to pay the FDIC 
$17.2 million over a period of more than four years in exchange for the FDIC subordinating its claim to the 
unsecured creditors. Id. at 794–95. The trustee continuously implemented the plan until November 7, 1979. Id. 
at 798. 
 80 Id.  
 81 See id.  
 82 Id. at 797. 
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reorganization. Despite this emphasis, however, the court did not define what 
constituted “intricate and involved transactions.”83 Each circuit subsequently 
adopted the doctrine over the years,84 but the circuits were left without 
guidance on how the Ninth Circuit’s decision fit with other mootness 
doctrines. 
C. Equitable Mootness’s Distinct Features 
Appellate courts have determined equitable mootness is not Constitutional 
(Article III) mootness or statutory mootness.85 Constitutional mootness arises 
when a change in circumstances prevents a court’s ability to grant any relief 
whatsoever.86 A real and substantial case or controversy must exist throughout 
the litigation that requires specific relief.87 Statutory mootness arises from two 
specific Code provisions directly limiting an appellate court’s ability to 
overturn certain post-petition transactions if a party in interest did not timely 
file a stay.88 
Equitable mootness is much broader than both constitutional and statutory 
mootness.89 The requested relief is still possible, but offering that relief is no 
longer feasible.90 The Fourth Circuit in MAC Panel Company v. Virginia Panel 
Corporation explained that the doctrine is grounded in the notion that “with 
the passage of time after a judgment . . . effective relief becomes impracticable, 
imprudent, and therefore inequitable.”91 
 
 83 See id.  
 84 See Nil Ghosh, Plan Accordingly: The Third Circuit Delivers a Knockout Punch with Equitable 
Mootness, 23 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 224, n.8 (2014), Westlaw, 23 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. NL 2 Art. 3 
(listing the circuits’ adoption of equitable mootness over the years). 
 85 See Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber 
Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2005); In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 86 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 87 See Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The constitutional mootness 
question is a threshold inquiry because a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal 
jurisdiction” (citation omitted)). 
 88 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (2012) (limiting ability to overturn transactions involving extensions of credit 
through debt, a lien, or priority to a debtor); id. § 363(m) (limiting ability to overturn transactions involving 
sales or leases of property); see also In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 769 (using § 1127(b) as an example of 
statutory mootness). 
 89 See In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 
558; George W. Kuney, Slipping Into Mootness, in 2007 NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 267, 269. 
 90 See In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 769–70 (“There is a big difference between inability to alter the 
outcome (‘real mootness’) and unwillingness to alter the outcome (‘equitable mootness’).”). 
 91 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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The Second Circuit in In re Chateugay provided a concise example of 
when it is appropriate for a court to dismiss an appeal as moot.92 The court in 
In re Chateugay focused on the change in circumstances in the period between 
the confirmation order and the appellate hearing.93 Continued implementation 
of the reorganization plan produced a point in time beyond which an appellate 
court could order the changes an appellant seeks.94 The doctrine reflects the 
belief that finality in bankruptcy proceedings is vital to fashioning an effective 
reorganization.95 
The need for finality is crucial because a debtor’s chances of returning to 
viability upon exiting bankruptcy are tenuous at best.96 Professor Foteini 
Teloni took a sample size of 390 large public companies that both filed and 
exited chapter 11 by confirming a plan.97 Professor Teloni found that 48% of 
those companies refiled within five years.98 While a confirmed plan does not 
guarantee success, third party reliance on that plan at least gives the 
reorganized company a fighting chance.99 Equitable mootness is the “last-
ditch . . . device for protecting the finality of an unstayed plan that has been 
substantially consummated.”100 The doctrine is essentially a “super-finality 
rule.”101 
 
 92 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 93 See id. at 325 (quoting In re Crystal Oil Co., 854 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Roberts 
Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981))). 
 94 See id. (citation omitted); see also United States ex rel. FCC v. GWI PCS 1, Inc. (In re GWI PCS 1, 
Inc.), 230 F.3d 788, 800 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1038–44 (5th Cir. 1994)); In re 
Innovative Clinical Sols., Ltd., 302 B.R. 136, 142 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (“Confirmation plans eventually reach 
a point of completion where to reverse the confirmation order would be ‘knock the props out from under the 
authorization of every action that has taken place’ under the plan.” (quoting In re Servico, Inc., 161 B.R. 297, 
301 (S.D. Fla. 1993)). 
 95 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 10; see also Lenard Parkins et. al., Equitable Mootness: Will Surgery 
Kill the Patient?, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2010, at 40 (“Finality of judgments is important—so 
important, in fact, that the concept of finality has been described as fundamental to the rule of law.”). 
 96 See Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned Cases, and Refiling Rates: An Empirical 
Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571, 571 (2015) (arguing that chapter 11 
does not achieve true rehabilitation). 
 97 Id. at 582. 
 98 Id. at 589. 
 99 See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 100 In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016). 
 101 Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 6. 
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The doctrine raises controversy because it is one thing for a reorganization 
plan to bind the parties to a bankruptcy case, but another for a plan “to bind an 
appellate court tasked with reviewing its validity.”102 The Eleventh Circuit in In 
re Club Associates identified this issue.103 The court found “[t]he test for 
mootness reflects a court’s concern for striking the proper balance between the 
equitable considerations of finality and good faith reliance on a judgment and 
the competing interests that underlie the right of a party to seek review of a 
bankruptcy court order adversely affecting him.”104 The way in which each 
circuit balanced these principles and applied the doctrine differed following In 
re Roberts Farms.105 
D. The Circuits’ Varying Analyses and Subsidiary Considerations 
The circuits have not followed a uniform approach when applying equitable 
mootness; they cannot even agree on the proper name for the doctrine.106 
Although the circuits intended to apply equitable mootness narrowly, to 
complex reorganizations,107 the lack of a uniform approach has prevented its 
proper application.108 
 
 102 Id.; see In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 438 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring) 
(“[E]quitable mootness merely serves as part of a blueprint for implementing questionable plans that favor 
creditors over others without oversight by Article III judges.”); Freeman, supra note 7, at 546 (“[T]he 
problems direct appeals create highlight a tension inherent in bankruptcy law: the need to balance practical 
considerations such as speed, efficiency, and specialized review, with constitutional values, including fairness, 
due process, and the right to an appeal.”). 
 103 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 7. 
 106 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1330 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that equitable mootness is a “misnomer” and that the “doctrine more correctly should be called 
equitable avoidance or equitable bar”); In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 559 (3d Cir. 1996) (acknowledging 
that the term “equitable mootness” is an inapt description, but adopting the term nonetheless); In re UNR 
Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Using one word for two different concepts breeds confusion.”). 
 107 See, e.g., Duff v. Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, LLC, 801 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2015) (identifying the 
limited circumstances in which courts should apply the doctrine); In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272,279 
(3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e decline to disturb ‘complex transactions undertaken after the Plan was consummated’ 
that would be most difficult to unravel.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 
691 F.3d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 2012) (determining that the relief the appellants requested would require 
“unraveling complex transactions undertaken after the Plan was consummated”); In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that a court only should apply equitable mootness “if 
doing so will unscramble complex bankruptcy reorganizations”); SEC v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 
733, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The doctrine also turns in part on whether the transactions at issue are complex 
and would be difficult to unwind.”). 
 108 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 7. 
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1. Application in the Various Circuits 
The circuits’ different equitable mootness analyses attempt to answer the 
same question: is it prudent to upset the plan of reorganization at this late 
stage?109 The circuits attempt to answer this question through a factor-
balancing test.110 The burden of showing an appeal is equitably moot rests with 
the party seeking dismissal on equitable mootness grounds.111 The majority of 
circuits apply a combination of the following five factors when determining 
whether an appeal is equitably moot: 
(1) whether the reorganization plan has been substantially 
consummated; 
(2) whether a stay has been sought or obtained; 
(3) whether the requested relief would affect the rights of parties not 
before the court; 
(4) whether the relief requested would affect the success of the plan; 
and 
(5) the public policy of affording finality to confirmation orders.112 
The Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits each have their own specific 
applications.113 The circuits generally agree that the first step in the analysis is 
 
 109 See Parkins et. al., supra note 95, at 92. 
 110 See generally Caroline L. Rosiek, Note, Making Equitable Mootness Equal: The Need for a Uniform 
Approach to Appeals in the Context of Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685, 697–704 
(2007) (outlining each circuits’ equitable mootness analysis). 
 111 See, e.g., In re SemCrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e join other Courts of Appeals 
in placing the burden on the party seeking dismissal.”); Ala. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty. Affairs v. Ball 
Healthcare-Dallas, LLC (In re Lett), 632 F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The party asserting mootness 
bears the burden of persuasion.”); In re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1339–40 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e hold that the 
party seeking to prevent this court from reaching the merits of the appeal bears the burden of proving that . . . 
the court should abstain from reaching the merits of the case.”); Focus Media, Inc. v. NBA (In re Focus 
Media), Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (placing the burden on the party asserting the appeal is 
equitably moot). 
 112 See Ryan M. Murphy, Equitable Mootness Should Be Used as a Scalpel Rather than an Axe in 
Bankruptcy Appeals, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., 2010, at 33 (consolidating the circuits’ analyses). The 
Third Circuit consolidated its analysis into two analytical steps in In re Semcrude: (1) whether a confirmed 
plan has been substantially consummated; and (2) if it has, whether granting the relief requested in the appeal 
will either (a) fatally scramble the plan, and/or (b) significantly harm third parties who have justifiably relied 
on plan confirmation. 728 F.3d at 321. The circuits differ on the fifth factor, the public policy of affording 
finality to confirmation orders. See Rosiek, supra note 110, at 697–98. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits 
leave the public policy of affording finality to bankruptcy confirmations as an additional consideration, 
whereas the Third and Tenth Circuits formally adopted the public policy consideration as an additional fifth 
factor. See id. at 698. 
 113 See Murphy, supra note 112, at 33. 
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to determine whether a plan has been substantially consummated.114 The Code 
defines “substantial consummation” as: 
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the 
plan to be transferred; 
(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under 
the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially 
all of the property dealt with by the plan; and 
(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.115 
The weight appellate courts give to each factor116 and the standard of review117 
also differs from circuit to circuit. 
Importantly, the Second Circuit’s equitable mootness analysis specifically 
addresses “intricate transactions” in its third factor.118 This recognition, 
however, lies buried in the middle of the analysis. How can the Second Circuit 
expect to apply the doctrine only to complex reorganizations when “intricate 
transactions” are a third consideration? The other circuits opinions do not 
contain an express consideration regarding a reorganization’s complexity. 
Rather, “complexity” is a vague standard surrounding the doctrine. 
2. Subsidiary Considerations 
The doctrine’s analysis involves other subsidiary questions.119 The Eleventh 
Circuit in In re Club Associates identified them as: 
 
 114 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 11. 
 115 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (2012). 
 116 Compare SRE Restructuring, Inc. v. Wooley (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 542 F.3d 131, 136 (5th Cir. 
2008) (finding that effect on the rights of third parties as the most important factor of the equitable mootness 
test), and In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 204 F. App’x 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he foremost 
consideration is whether the reorganization plan has been consummated.” (citation omitted)), with Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.) (Chateaugay II), 94 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 
1996) (“Reviewing courts presume that it will be inequitable or impractical to grant relief after substantial 
consummation of a plan of reorganization.”). 
 117 See generally Pechous, supra note 42, at 551–54 (outlining the different standards of review appellate 
courts use and arguing for a universal abuse of discretion standard). 
 118 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The presumption of equitable 
mootness can be overcome, however, if all five of the ‘Chateaugay factors’ are met: . . . (3) such relief will not 
unravel intricate transactions so as to knock the props out from under the authorization for every transaction 
that has taken place and create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 119 See In re Club Assocs., 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 n.11 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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Has a stay pending appeal been obtained? If not, then why not? Has 
the plan been substantially consummated? If so, what kind of 
transactions have been consummated? What type of relief does the 
appellant seek on appeal? What effect would granting relief have on 
the interests of third parties not before the court? And, would relief 
affect the re-emergence of the debtor as a revitalized entity?120 
These questions are meant to provide the full backdrop against which to apply 
equitable mootness.121 The court in In re Club Associates, however, did not 
identify when an appellate court should ask these questions. If these questions 
are meant to supply the backdrop, why would an appellate court treat the 
inquiry into the type of transactions involved as a third consideration? The 
types of transactions would seem to be key in determining if a complex 
reorganization occurred.122 
The circuits agree they should apply equitable mootness narrowly to 
complex reorganizations,123 yet their analyses outlined above lack a formal 
assessment of whether a complex reorganization occurred.124 Even though the 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See In re Mortgs., Ltd., 771 F.3d 1211, 1215 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 123 See, e.g., Duff v. Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, LLC, 801 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2015) (identifying the 
limited circumstances in which courts should apply the doctrine); In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 279 
(3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e decline to disturb ‘complex transactions undertaken after the Plan was consummated’ 
that would be most difficult to unravel.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 
691 F.3d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 2012) (determining that the relief the appellants requested would require 
“unraveling complex transactions undertaken after the Plan was consummated”); In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that a court only should apply equitable mootness “if 
doing so will unscramble complex bankruptcy reorganizations”); SEC v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 
733, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The doctrine also turns in part on whether the transactions at issue are complex 
and would be difficult to unwind.”). 
 124 See, e.g., Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. One2One Commc’ns, LLC (In re One2One Commc'ns, LLC), No. 
13-1675 (JLL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103409, at *4–5 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013) (discussing the doctrine’s basis 
in the Third Circuit and then beginning the analysis), rev’d, 805 F.3d 428, 434 (3d Cir. 2015); Unarco 
Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., 165 B.R. 198, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (beginning its analysis 
without addressing the reorganization plan and its transactions complexity); United States v. GWI PCS 1, Inc., 
245 B.R. 59, 62 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (lacking even a mention of complexity before the court began its analysis); 
Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co. (In re Mac Panel Co.) (Mac Panel I), 257 B.R. 773, 775 (M.D.N.C. 
2000) (discussing the monetary provisions of the plan, but not assessing whether the plan was complex); Alta. 
Energy Partners v. Blast Energy Servs., Inc. (In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc.), No. H-08-00750, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33819, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (beginning its equitable mootness analysis without discussing 
complexity), vacated, 593 F.3d 418, 424–25 (5th Cir. 2010); Cadle Co. II v. PC Liquidation Corp. (In re PC 
Liquidation Corp.), 383 B.R. 856, 862–63 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (beginning its equitable mootness analysis without 
discussing complexity). 
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Second Circuit considers “intricate transactions” in its third factor, this 
consideration lies buried in the middle of the analysis.125 
If appellate courts are concerned with applying the doctrine to a narrow set 
of circumstances—complex reorganizations—then why do they not engage in 
an assessment of “complexity” that could help them eliminate appeals that do 
not warrant the analysis? The Third Circuit confronted this issue in In re 
One2One and demonstrated an effective way to formally assess complexity 
before turning to an equitable mootness analysis.126 
II. ANALYSIS 
This Comment will argue that to apply equitable mootness to its proper 
scope, appellate courts should determine whether a complex reorganization 
occurred as a threshold matter. Even though this judicially-created doctrine is a 
“super-finality” rule,127 it is consistent with the Code because the Code itself 
reflects a similar principle regarding the high standards for revoking chapter 11 
confirmation orders.128 This Comment will then provide a positive approach to 
“complexity” in light of In re One2One, followed by a normative approach 
appellate courts should adopt that would determine whether a complex 
reorganization occurred. 
A. The Code and an Elevated Sense of Finality: § 1144 
Equitable mootness drives forward the principle of affording finality to 
chapter 11 confirmation orders,129 an inherent goal in the chapter 11 
confirmation process.130 While this “super-finality” doctrine raises controversy, 
the Code itself actually reflects an elevated sense of finality in § 1144.131 
 
 125 See In re Charter Commc’ns, 691 F.3d at 482. 
 126 See In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 434–36 (3d Cir. 2015)  
 127 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 6. 
 128 See 11 U.S.C. § 1144 (2012). 
 129 See In re Age Ref., Inc., 537 F. App’x 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 
F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009)), aff’d, 801 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 
161, 169 (3d Cir. 2012); United Steelworks of Am. v. Ormet Corp. (In re Ormet Corp.), 355 B.R. 37, 40–41 
(S.D. Ohio 2006) (“It is a prudential doctrine that protects the need for finality in bankruptcy proceedings and 
allows third parties to rely on that finality.”).  
 130 See 8 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, ¶ 1144.02; see also Freeman supra note 7, at 572 (“It is central 
to bankruptcy that parties can rely on final orders so that they may continue with their business.”). 
 131 See 11 U.S.C. § 1144; 8 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, ¶ 1144.02 (“Section 1144 creates a high 
standard for overturning confirmation consistent with the policy of finality with respect to chapter 11 plans.”). 
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Two ways exist to directly attack a chapter 11 plan confirmation order.132 
First, a party can file an appeal.133 Second, a party can seek revocation of the 
confirmation order through § 1144 of the Code.134 Section 1144 provides that 
the only way for a court to revoke a confirmation order is if two things occur: 
(1) a party in interest files a motion to revoke the plan within 180 days of 
confirmation; and (2) the confirmation order was procured by fraud.135 This 
provision is the sole way a court can revoke a chapter 11 confirmation order.136 
Section 1144 creates a high standard for overturning a confirmation order 
because of the provision’s two stringent requirements.137 The party in interest 
must file its motion within 180 days of the date confirming the order.138 
Furthermore, the court must find that the debtor or plan proponent procured the 
confirmation order through fraud.139 
These requirements are consistent with the policy of finality with respect to 
chapter 11 plans by providing a narrow way to revoke a confirmation order.140 
Collier on Bankruptcy explains that “[i]f plans could be overturned or 
rescinded except in the most extreme of circumstances, the reliability of the 
plan process would be undermined.”141 
 
 132 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 1144. Orders confirming chapter 11 plans are final 
judgments. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1692 (2015) (citations omitted). A final judgment 
is one that ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute judgment. See M.A. 
ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 343 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Cunningham v. 
Hamilton Cty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999)). Although Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024 might 
provide an additional avenue of attack on such orders, that issue is still an open one and beyond the scope of 
this Comment. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 n.9 (2010). 
 133 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 
 134 See 11 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024; 8 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, ¶ 1144.02 (noting that while Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024 provides that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60 applies in 
bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Rule 9024 specifically provides that that Federal Rule 60 may not be used as a basis 
for revoking an order of confirmation); see also In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 386 B.R. 518, 531 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 137 See 11 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 138 Id. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure reinforce this strict timeline. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 
9024(3). 
 139 11 U.S.C. § 1144; 8 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, ¶ 1144.01. 
 140 See 8 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, ¶ 1144.02. 
 141 Id. ¶ 1144.01. 
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Yet even if a party in interest does satisfy these two requirements, an 
important aspect of § 1144 is that relief is discretionary.142 The decision to 
revoke the order is in the court’s discretion because of the statute’s use of the 
word “may” and the conditions to revocation.143  
Section 1144(1) requires the order revoking confirmation to include “such 
provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith 
reliance on the order of confirmation.”144 Therefore, an appellate court must 
look at all the circumstances and determine “whether revocation of the 
confirmation can or would lead to an outcome that is more equitable than 
leaving the order intact.”145 If it cannot find such relief, the court will dismiss 
the challenge. 
In the context of a Code provision illustrating elevated finality, courts also 
take into account equity considerations because of the narrow relief 
requirements.146 This approach serves bankruptcy courts’ role as courts of 
equity.147 The Code, through § 1144, provides a way to think about equitable 
mootness and its “super-finality” nature.148 
 
 142 See Salsberg v. Trico Marine Servs., Inc. (In re Trico Marine Servs., Inc.) (Trico I), 337 B.R. 811, 814 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing 8 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, ¶ 1144.03). In an adversary proceeding 
seeking reversal of the court’s plan confirmation order, the debtor initially filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint on equitable mootness grounds. At oral argument, the court announced that the debtor’s motion to 
dismiss would be treated instead as a motion for summary judgment. Trico I, 337 B.R. at 815. See generally 
Salsberg v. Trico Marine Servs., Inc. (In re Trico Marine Servs., Inc.) (Trico II), 343 B.R. 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (providing the final resolution of the adversary proceeding in Trico I and comparing the court’s 
reasoning in Trico I to the analysis of similar issues by courts dismissing revocation complaints “on equitable 
mootness grounds”). 
 143 See In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 386 B.R. 518, 532 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Trico II, 343 B.R. at 75 
(dismissing an action brought under § 1144 because even if the plaintiff could prove fraud, the court could not 
fashion a remedy that met the requirements of § 1144). 
 144 11 U.S.C. § 1144(1). 
 145 See Trico I, 337 B.R. at 814 (quoting 8 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, ¶ 1144.03); see also In re 
Delta, 386 B.R. at 522 (“[I]f a court cannot fashion a revocation order that protects innocent parties who 
acquired rights in reliance on the confirmation order, the court is barred from revoking the confirmation 
order—even if the order was procured by fraud.”). 
 146 See 11 U.S.C. § 1144(1). 
 147 See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 
(1939)); In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 287 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 1459 (2016). While the common understanding is that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, this 
proposition is contested. See generally Alan M. Ahart, A Stern Reminder That the Bankruptcy Court Is Not A 
Court of Equity, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191 (2012) [hereinafter Ahart, A Stern Reminder]; Ahart, The Limited 
Scope, supra note 22, at 1; Adam J. Levitin, Toward A Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial 
Lawmaking in A Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2006). 
 148 See 8 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 2, ¶ 1144.03. 
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Equitable mootness’s misapplication resulted in criticisms and 
limitations.149 The criticisms and limitations culminated in three decisions 
issued within 10 weeks of each other: In re Transwest150 in the Ninth Circuit, 
and In re One2One151 and In re Tribune Media,152 both in the Third Circuit. 
Of these three opinions, the one that demonstrated the most effective way 
to apply equitable mootness properly was In re One2One.153 The Third 
Circuit’s approach first assessed whether a complex reorganization occurred 
before the court proceeded to its equitable mootness analysis.154 With In re 
One2One serving as a case study, appellate courts can discern what factors 
make up a “complex” reorganization and how to properly apply the doctrine. 
B. In re One2One Communications: Guidance on How to Assess Whether a 
Complex Reorganization Occurred 
In In re One2One, the Third Circuit demonstrated the effective way to 
assess whether a complex reorganization occurred, as a threshold matter, 
before proceeding to its equitable mootness analysis.155 In In re One2One, the 
debtor sought chapter 11 protection after the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin levied a $9 million judgment against the company.156 
Other than the $9 million judgment, the debtor had one secured creditor owed 
less than $100,000 with a blanket lien on all of its assets.157 Additionally, the 
debtor had seventeen unsecured creditors, excluding insiders.158 
 
 149 See In re SemCrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 326–27 (3d Cir. 2013) (narrowing the doctrine); In re Pac. 
Lumber Co, 584 F.3d 229, 240–41 (5th Cir. 2009) (narrowing the scope of equitable mootness); see also 
Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J., concurring); In re 
Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 569 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (questioning the doctrine’s basis in law 
and whether the goal of furthering the Code was enough authority to refuse to entertain a viable appeal); In re 
UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e banish ‘equitable mootness’ from the (local) lexicon. We 
ask not whether the case is moot, ‘equitably’ or otherwise, but whether it is prudent to upset the plan of 
reorganization at this late date.”). 
 150 801 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 151 805 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 152 799 F.3d 272, 289 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016). 
 153 See In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 434–36. This decision also contained a concurrence described as “a 
full blown, no[-]page[-]limit[] attack on equitable mootness.” Markell, supra note 27. 
 154 In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 435–36. 
 155 See id. 
 156 See Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 529 F. App’x 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2013). The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that judgment during the bankruptcy appeal. Id. at 793. 
 157 See In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 435. 
 158 See id.  
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Under the reorganization plan, a third party, the Plan Sponsor, acquired a 
membership interest in the debtor.159 The plan incorporated an additional 
agreement that provided the Plan Sponsor with the exclusive right to purchase 
100% of the debtor’s equity for $200,000.160 Neither the Plan Sponsor nor any 
third party would contribute any additional capital to fund the reorganization 
plan.161 The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan over the appellant’s 
objection, and the district court granted the debtor’s motion to dismiss the 
appeal as equitably moot.162 
On appeal, the Third Circuit, instead of delving into the circuit’s equitable 
mootness analysis, began its discussion by stating that in a prior decision, “this 
Court emphasized ‘that a court only should apply the equitable mootness 
doctrine . . . [in] complex bankruptcy reorganizations.’”163 The court contrasted 
prior equitable mootness dismissals with the appeal at hand.164 The court 
determined those appeals warranted the doctrine’s application because they 
were “complex bankruptcy reorganizations that included multiple related 
debtors, hundreds of millions of dollars in assets, liabilities, and claims, and 
hundreds or thousands of creditors.”165 
The reorganization plan at hand, however, did not contain any of those 
characteristics.166 The court found the plan “did not provide for new financing, 
mergers or dissolutions of entities, issuance of stock or bonds, name change, 
change of business location, change in management or any other significant 
transactions.”167 The court determined that the transactions the debtor identified 
in support of its equitable mootness dismissal motion were “routine 
transactions . . . likely to transpire in almost every bankruptcy 
reorganization.”168 Importantly, the court highlighted that the plan did not 
involve the issuance of any publicly traded securities or mergers.169 As a result, 
the court determined that “this case did not involve a sufficiently complex 
 
 159 Id. at 431. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 431–32. 
 162 Id. at 432. 
 163 Id. at 435 (citing In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 164 See id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 435–36.  
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 436. 
 169 Id. at 437. 
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bankruptcy reorganization such that dismissal on the basis of equitable 
mootness would be appropriate” and remanded the case to the district court.170  
The court’s assessment of whether a complex reorganization occurred in In 
re One2One demonstrated the most effective way to determine when not to 
apply equitable mootness. Instead of delving right into its factor test, the court 
began by looking at the transactions involved in the reorganization, the size of 
the bankruptcy, and the number of claimants.171 Although the court went on to 
apply its test, it was clear from its discussion that it would remand the appeal 
because this reorganization plan was not the type that warranted the doctrine’s 
analysis. The lingering question from In re One2One is why should an 
appellate court proceed to its equitable mootness analysis when it already 
determined a complex reorganization did not occur? It should not. 
C. What Constitutes a “Complex” Reorganization? 
While In re One2One illustrated an effective way to use “complexity” as 
the gatekeeper to the doctrine, the fact still remains that appellate courts do not 
formally determine whether a complex reorganization occurred.172 The result is 
the doctrine’s misapplication to relatively simple bankruptcies.173 But when 
looking at the landscape of first- and second-level appellate decisions, some 
guiding factors come to light that help determine what constitutes a “complex” 
reorganization. The four factors appellate courts typically identify are: (1) size 
of the bankruptcy; (2) whether the plan was a liquidation or reorganization 
plan; (3) types of transactions involved; and (4) whether a settlement 
agreement was the fulcrum of the plan. 
 
 170 Id. at 437–38. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See, e.g., Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. One2One Commc’ns, LLC, No. 13-1675 (JLL), 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 103409, at *11–13 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013), (discussing the doctrine’s basis in the Third Circuit and then 
beginning the analysis), rev’d 805 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 386 B.R. 518, 534–35 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing complexity in the context of the appellant’s § 1144 argument, then giving 
substantial consummation the most weight in the analysis); In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc., No. H-08-00750, 
2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 33819, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2008) (beginning its equitable mootness analysis 
without discussing complexity); In re PC Liquidation Corp., 383 B.R. 856, 862–63 (E.D. N.Y 2008) 
(beginning its equitable mootness analysis without discussing complexity); MAC Panel I, 257 B.R. 773, 775 
(M.D. N.C. 2000) (discussing the monetary provisions of the plan, but not assessing whether the plan was 
complex); United States v. GWI PCS 1, Inc., 245 B.R. 59, 62 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (lacking even a mention of 
complexity before the court began its analysis); Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., 165 
B.R. 198, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (beginning its analysis without addressing the reorganization plan and its 
transactions complexity). 
 173 See In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 446 (Krause, J., concurring); see also Markell, supra note 
27(“[Litigants] pressed equitable mootness in all cases, even ones that were small and simple.”). 
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1. The Size of the Bankruptcy 
One major aspect of a reorganization plan appellate courts associate with 
“complexity” is the size of the bankruptcy. Size involves the debtor’s assets, 
liabilities, and number of parties involved in a case.174 The clearest instances 
where courts associate size with complexity are the so-called “mega 
bankruptcies,” with large, publicly traded companies.175 For example, in ACC 
Bondholder Group v. Adelphia Communications Corp. (In re Adelphia 
Communications Corp.), the debtor had over $28 billion in pre-filing assets 
and over one thousand creditors.176 Similarly, in Korth v. Dura Auto. Sys. (In re 
Dura Auto. Sys.), the debtor had over $2 billion dollars in pre-filing assets and 
over 100,000 creditors.177 In those cases, the appellate courts considered the 
debtors’ reorganization plans complex because the plans involved billions of 
dollars in distributions and redefined thousands of creditors’ rights.178 
In contrast are the “garden-variety” bankruptcies that typically involve 
small, privately held businesses with few claims against them.179 These types 
 
 174 See, e.g., In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 435–36 (stating that the court’s prior equitable mootness 
decisions were inapposite here because the debtor’s reorganization involved a $200,000 investment in the 
reorganized debtor, one secured creditor, and only seventeen unsecured creditors); In re Delta, 386 B.R. at 533 
(“This case, in contrast, was one of the more complex Chapter 11 cases—at the time of filing, the case was the 
tenth largest bankruptcy ever filed in the United States.”); see also Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 
258 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although the plan here is not as complex as the plan in Continental 
Airlines, it is hardly simple. The plan required eighteen months of negotiation between several parties 
regarding hundreds of millions of dollars, restructured the debt, assets, and management of a major 
corporation, and successfully rejuvenated Zenith.”).  
 175 See, e.g., In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 
553 (3d Cir. 1996); Ad Hoc Comm. of Convertible Noteholders v. Spansion Inc. (In re Spansion, Inc.), Nos. 
10-369, 10-385, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86152 (D. Del. Aug. 4, 2011); Korth v. Dura Auto. Sys. (In re Dura 
Auto. Sys.), 403 B.R. 300 (D. Del. 2009); Compania Internacional Financeria S.A. v. Calpine Corp. (In re 
Calpine Corp.), 390 B.R. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); ACC Bondholder Group v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re 
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 367 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 176 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Adelphia Communications Corp., UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH 
DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/companyinfo.asp?name=Adelphia+Communications+Corp%2E (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
 177 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Dura Automotive Systems, Inc. UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH 
DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/companyinfo.asp?name=Dura+Automotive+Systems%2C+Inc%2E 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
 178 See Brief and Appendix Volume I of VII (Pages A1 to A22) on Behalf of Appellant Quad/Graphics, 
Inc. at 26–29, In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3410), 2014 WL 
2047703, at *26–29 (listing bankruptcies of large publicly traded companies and the contents of their plans). 
 179 See In re One2One, 805 F.3d at 434–35 (3d Cir. 2015); PVP Indus. v. Millburn Peat Co. (In re 
Millburn Peat Co.), 384 B.R. 510, 514 (N.D. Ind. 2008); In re Club Assocs., 956 F.2d 1065, 1066–67 (11th 
Cir. 1992). 
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of businesses make up 85-90% of chapter 11 filings each year.180 A great 
example is the debtor in In re One2One, where the bankruptcy involved one 
closely held corporate debtor with assets valued at less than $500,000 and total 
unsecured claims of less than $1.3 million.181 Similarly, in PVP Indus. v. 
Millburn Peat Co. (In re Millburn Peat Co., Inc.), the chapter 11 case 
consisted of four entities owned by one individual and the debtor’s primary 
creditor had one secured claim totaling $5,903,669.20.182 As the District Court 
for the Northern District of Indiana noted, the debtors involved were relatively 
simple companies and had few other claims apart from the primary creditor.183 
These examples show the two opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes 
to the size of a bankruptcy. While it may not seem fair to compare a large, 
publicly held corporation like the debtor in In re Adelphia to the closely held 
limited liability company in In re One2One, the “size” of a bankruptcy is a 
necessary part of determining what constitutes a “complex” chapter 11 
reorganization. The size of the case provides the backdrop against which to 
examine the reorganization plan. 
2. Liquidation v. Reorganization 
Appellate courts also look at whether a chapter 11 plan was a liquidation or 
reorganization plan.184 Although the doctrine is most associated with 
reorganization plans, appellate courts have addressed, and applied, equitable 
mootness in the liquidation context.185 The most notable decision applying 
equitable mootness to chapter 11 liquidations is the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Beeman v. BGI Creditors’ Liquidating Trust (In re BGI, Inc.). In In re BGI, 
 
 180 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 288 (2014). 
 181 See Brief and Appendix Volume I of VII (Pages A1 to A22) on Behalf of Appellant Quad/Graphics, 
Inc., supra note 178, at 29. 
 182 In re Millburn Peat, 384 B.R. at 512. Under the plan, this creditor would receive $3,653,000. Id. at 
513. 
 183 See id. at 514. 
 184 George Kildonas, Liquidating Plans Are Also Subject to Equitable Mootness Dismissal, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Mar. 24, 2015, at 22–23. At least one appellate court has discussed equitable mootness and its 
application to receiverships. See Duff v. Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, LLC, 801 F.3d 833, 840–41 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 185 See, e.g., Zegeer v. President Casinos, Inc. (In re President Casinos, Inc.), 409 Fed. App’x 31 (8th Cir. 
2010) (dismissing an appeal related to a chapter 11 liquidation proceeding as equitably moot); Schaefer v. 
Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. (In re Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc.), 591 F.3d 350, 353–54 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(applying equitable mootness analysis to appeal of order confirming a chapter 11 liquidation plan); Sutton v. 
Weinman (In re Centrix Fin. LLC), 355 Fed. Appx. 199, 201–02 (10th Cir. 2009) (remanding appeal to district 
court in a chapter 11 liquidation proceeding to apply equitable mootness analysis). 
JUMBECK GALLEYSPROOFS3 12/26/2016 12:56 PM 
196 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 33 
the Second Circuit held that equitable mootness also applied to chapter 11 
liquidations.186 
In In re BGI, the liquidation plan provided that the debtors would dissolve, 
and a liquidating trust would liquidate the Debtors’ remaining assets and make 
distributions to unsecured creditors after paying administrative, secured, and 
unsecured priority claims.187 The appellants filed late proofs claims for their 
gift cards to the debtor’s business and asked the bankruptcy court to certify a 
new class of gift card holders.188 
In holding that the doctrine applied to chapter 11 liquidations, the Second 
Circuit reasoned that in liquidation plans, parties still expend considerable time 
and effort toward developing an emergence from bankruptcy.189 The court also 
considered the effect on creditors by finding that “creditors with urgent needs 
may have been stayed from accessing assets and funds to which they are 
entitled.”190 In support of its conclusion, the Second Circuit cited examples 
from other circuits that applied equitable mootness to liquidation plans.191 
Based on the court’s decision in In re BGI and other circuits’ applications, 
whether a plan involved liquidation or reorganization is therefore a factor in 
determining “complexity.” 
3. The Type of Transactions Involved in a Chapter 11 Reorganization 
Another aspect appellate courts assess when determining “complexity” are 
the types of transaction involved in a reorganization.192 These transactions, 
depending on the bankruptcy case, include: issuing publicly traded securities in 
 
 186 Beeman v. BGI Creditors’ Liquidating Tr. (In re BGI, Inc.), 772 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e 
hold that the analysis outlined in Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944 (2d 
Cir. 1993) . . . also governs our mootness analysis in Chapter 11 liquidations.”), cert. denied sub nom. Beeman 
v. BGI Creditor’s Liquidating Tr., 136 S. Ct. 155 (2015). See generally Klidonas, supra note 185, at 22. 
 187 In re BGI, 772 F.3d at 105 n.4. 
 188 See id. at 106. 
 189 See id. at 108–09. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 109 n.10.  
 192 See, e.g., Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2001); Little v. Amber 
Hotel Corp. (In re Amber Hotel Corp.), No. CV 14-9254 FMO, 2015 WL 5104678, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 
2015) (“An appeal is equitably moot if the case presents transactions that are so complex or difficult to unwind 
that debtors, creditors, and third parties are entitled to rely on the final bankruptcy court order.”); Schroeder v. 
New Century Liquidating Tr. (In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.), 407 B.R. 576, 587 (D. Del. 2009) 
(“[U]nraveling a substantially consummated plan can be difficult and inequitable . . . [I]t requires reversing 
multiple, often complex, future looking transactions (securing financing, issuing equity, contracting with 
producers and/or suppliers, etc.).”). 
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a reorganized debtor;193 swapping debt for equity in a reorganized debtor, or 
vice versa;194 merging or dissolving the debtor and other entities into a new, 
rejuvenated one;195 public offerings;196 bond or stock cancellations;197 working 
out new contracts for leases, sales, and other options;198 and post-petition 
financing.199 This list is by no means exhaustive because plans often involve 
other complex transactions that are tied specifically to the debtor’s industry, 
such as contracting for new flight routes in In re Continental Airlines.200 
The types of transactions under a plan are a seminal consideration for 
appellate courts in equitable mootness appeals.201 Identifying the transactions 
in a plan goes back to the foundational opinion in In re Roberts Farms202 and is 
the third consideration in the Second Circuit’s equitable mootness analysis.203 
The types of transactions involved are therefore a necessary factor when 
determining whether a complex reorganization occurred.204 
 
 193 See, e.g., In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179, 194 (9th Cir. 1977); Alsohaibi v. 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c) (In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C)), No. 13 CIV. 5755 SAS, 2014 WL 46552, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014); In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 386 B.R. 518, 534–35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Trico II, 
343 B.R. 68, 69–70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). See generally Markell, supra note 27. 
 194 See In re Innovative Clinical Sols., Ltd., 302 B.R. 136, 138 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
 195 See, e.g., In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 567 (3d. Cir. 1996); In re Arcapita Bank, 2014 WL 46552, 
at *12; In re Delta, 386 B.R. at 534–35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); CIRCLE K CORP. v. CIRCLE K CORP., 
171 B.R. 666, 669–70 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2 n.1, In re Transwest Resort 
Props., Inc., 801 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-17176). 
 196 See, e.g., In re Delta, 386 B.R. 518, 534–35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Trico II, 343 B.R. at 69–70; In re 
Innovative Clinical Sols., 302 B.R. at 141; In re Servico, Inc., 161 B.R. 297, 300 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 197 See, e.g., Perez v. Terrestar (In re Terrestar Corp.), No. 11-10612 (SHL), 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3298, at 
*8–9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015) reconsideration denied, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3298 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 15, 2016); Trico II, 343 B.R. at 71; CIRCLE K CORP., 171 B.R. at 669. 
 198 See, e.g., In re Delta, 386 B.R. at 534–35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 
supra note 195, at 7. 
 199 See, e.g., In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Arcapita 
Bank, 2014 WL 46552, at *7 (discussing the post-petition financing the debtor obtained, which included: $150 
million from one creditor, $350 million in replacement DIP financing from Goldman Sachs International, and 
an additional $175 million from another creditor); In re Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc., No. 13-53893-ASW, 2014 
WL 2219040, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 29, 2014); In re Delta, 386 B.R. at 534–35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2008); see also In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 567. 
 200 In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 567; see also In re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1332 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 201 See In re Mortgs. Ltd., 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Delta, 386 B.R. at 537. 
 202 652 F. 2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting plan involved “many intricate and involved transactions”). 
 203 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 2012) (“(3) “The presumption of 
equitable mootness can be overcome, however, if all five of the “Chateaugay factors” are met: . . . (3) such 
relief will not unravel intricate transactions so as to knock the props out from under the authorization for 
every transaction that has taken place and create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy 
Court.” (internal citations omitted)) (emphasis added). 
 204 See In re Mortgs., 771 F.3d at 1215. 
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4. Settlement Agreements 
The final aspect appellate courts look at is if the reorganization plan 
contained a settlement agreement, whether that agreement served as the 
centerpiece of the reorganization plan.205 Although settlement agreements may 
seem like another type of transaction, they are different in that they are 
backwards-looking,206 whereas other post-petition transactions tend to be 
forward-looking.207 Settlement agreements can be a compromise on any 
number of issues.208 They represent efforts at comprehensive negotiations that 
attempt to satisfy the differing interests of parties and settle complicated 
disputes threatening the debtor.209 The settlement agreement in Musilino v. 
Alabama Marble Co. demonstrated how several, unrelated third parties can 
infringe on each other’s rights through their own disputes with the debtor.210 
In Alabama Marble, the debtor and four parties, through a series of 
complicated events, became entangled in several different disputes.211 One 
 
 205 See, e.g., In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing the $1 billion dollar 
settlement plan which drove the reorganization), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016); Musilino v. Ala. Marble 
Co., 534 B.R. 820, 831–32 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (“A review of the record demonstrates that Appellants’ proposed 
partial relief would be ineffective because it would necessarily reform the parties’ Settlement Agreement to 
reflect an agreement that no party intended or contemplated.”), aff’d sub nom. In re Ala. Marble Co., Inc., No. 
15-13733, 628 Fed. App’x 746 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2016); In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C), No. 13 CIV. 5755 
SAS, 2014 WL 46552, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014) (“Numerous settlements were reached and implemented, 
including the payment of millions of dollars in severance payments made to former employees.”); In re Coll. 
Props., Ltd. v. Depetris (In re Coll. Props., Ltd.), No. BAP AZ-07-1075-PAAK, 2007 WL 7540957, at *1 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2007) (“The settlement agreement at issue in this appeal involves complex 
interactions and transactions among numerous parties.”). 
 206 See, e.g., Perez v. Terrestar (In re Terrestar Corp.), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118918, at *15, *16 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) (noting the release settlements freed the debtor from its pre-petition past). 
 207 See In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 576, 587 (D. Del. 2009). 
 208 See, e.g., In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179, 194 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Arcapita 
Bank, 2014 WL 46552, at *2 (“Numerous settlements were reached and implemented, including the payment 
of millions of dollars in severance payments made to former employees.”); In re Coll. Props., 2007 Bankr. 
LEXIS 4862, at *9–12 (discussing the settlement agreement between the two parties that was the focal point of 
the reorganization plan). 
 209 See, e.g., Ala. Marble Co., 534 B.R. at 831–32 (“When approving the Settlement Agreement, the 
Bankruptcy Court faced a complex multiparty bankruptcy dispute. The Settlement Agreement represented a 
comprehensive compromise that satisfied various parties with distinct . . . interests.”); In re Arcapita Bank, 
2014 WL 46552, at *2; In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 480–81 (2d Cir. 2012) (outlining key 
aspects of the Allen Settlement that served as the focal point of the reorganization); In re Coll. Props., 2007 
Bankr. LEXIS 4862, at *1–2 (“The settlement agreement at issue in this appeal involves complex interactions 
and transactions among numerous parties.”). 
 210 534 B.R. at 823–25. 
 211 See id. (recounting the facts of the case and the events that led to the different disputes). The other 
involved the validity of the lease that allowed the debtor, a marble-quarrier, to access a quarry to operate its 
business. Id. at 825.  
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dispute involved bond and security interest holders suing the debtor to enforce 
their notes and interests.212 The other dispute involved the validity of the lease 
that allowed the debtor, a marble-quarrier, to access a quarry to operate its 
business.213 
The parties eventually reached an agreement to settle the disputes, which 
included both financial and non-financial terms.214 The District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama determined that the settlement agreement 
“represented a comprehensive compromise that satisfied parties with distinct 
(and often conflicting) interests.”215 The reorganization plan and subsequent 
transactions stemmed from this agreement.216 
Although first- and second-level appellate courts have not formally 
articulated a way to assess “complexity,” they have demonstrated what aspects 
of a plan at which they do look. If an appellate court considered these factors 
before turning to its equitable mootness analysis, it could discern which 
appeals actually warranted an equitable mootness analysis.217 
D. A Normative Approach to “Complexity” 
Appellate courts can employ equitable mootness as intended—to complex 
reorganizations—by determining whether a complex reorganization occurred 
as a threshold matter. Appellate courts recognize that they should only apply 
the doctrine to complex reorganizations.218 Litigants are starting to recognize 
that complexity is almost a prerequisite to an equitable mootness analysis.219 
Appellate courts should therefore determine whether a complex reorganization 
occurred when a party asserts the appeal is equitably moot. Appellate courts 
 
 212 Id. at 824. 
 213 Id. at 825. 
 214 Id. at 825–26 (outlining the details of the parties’ agreement). 
 215 Id. 831–32. 
 216 See id. 
 217 See In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016); 
In re Mortgs. Ltd., 771 F.3d 1211, 1215 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 218 See, e.g., In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 279 (“[W]e decline to disturb complex transactions 
undertaken after the Plan was consummated that would be most difficult to unravel.”); In re Mortgs., 771 F.3d 
at 1215 n.2; In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 
690 F.3d 161, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2012); SEC. v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 397 F.3d 733, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“The doctrine also turns in part on whether the transactions at issue are complex and would be difficult to 
unwind.”). 
 219 See Brief and Appendix Volume I of VII (Pages A1 to A22) on Behalf of Appellant Quad/Graphics, 
Inc., supra note 178, at 25 (“Determining whether a reorganization is complex is arguably a prerequisite to 
applying the doctrine of equitable mootness.”). 
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should remand or hear the appeal if a reorganization does not meet this 
standard.220 
While defining such a standard is difficult because each chapter 11 case is 
unique,221 appellate courts can set the standard by engaging in a case-by-case 
assessment balancing four factors: (1) the size of the bankruptcy; (2) whether 
the plan is a liquidation or reorganization; (3) the types of transactions; and (4) 
if a reorganization plan contained a settlement agreement, whether that 
agreement served as the plan’s centerpiece. Although appellate courts should 
balance these factors, the factor that carries the most weight is the types of 
transactions if the transactions involved issuing publicly traded securities.222 
If a court determined a complex reorganization occurred after assessing 
these factors, then it should proceed to its equitable mootness analysis. If not, 
then it should remand the case or proceed to the merits of the appeal. Appellate 
courts can better determine when equitable mootness should not apply by 
adopting this approach. 
1. Size Is Not Dispositive 
The first aspect an appellate court should look at when determining 
whether a complex reorganization occurred is the size of the chapter 11 debtor 
based on its assets and liabilities. However, an appellate court should not 
consider the size of a debtor’s assets or liabilities dispositive. Drawing a line at 
a certain value would violate the principles of equity jurisprudence by not 
balancing interests between parties.223 
The American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of 
Chapter 11 found that companies without publicly traded securities and less 
than $10 million in assets or liabilities accounted for 85-90% of chapter 11 
filings in 2007.224 The Commission’s findings also showed that debtors with 
assets and liabilities over $50 million accounted for 1.7% and 2.9%, 
 
 220 See In re Mortgs., 771 F.3d at 1215. 
 221 See In re Scrub Island Dev. Grp. Ltd., 523 B.R. 862, 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015) (“Each chapter 11 
case is unique. Chapter 11 cases—whether individual or corporate—run the gamut from simple to exceedingly 
complex.”). 
 222 Trico II, 343 B.R. 68, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 223 See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Am. Rolling Mill Co., 82 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1936) (“[Equity] will 
always seek to strike a balance of convenience as between litigants.”); Motion for Leave to File and Brief of 
Bankruptcy Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Granting the Petition, supra note 23, at 10. 
 224 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 180, at 288. 
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respectively, of total filings.225 The Commission also found that companies 
with over $10 million but less than $50 million in assets or liabilities tend to 
have simple business and capital structures.226 The Commission relied on this 
data in formulating its definition of a “small- or medium-sized enterprise” 
because it found this data comprehensive, with adjustments, for filings in 
subsequent years.227  
Equitable mootness would seemingly not apply to these debtors because 
their plan would not present “[reorganizations or] transactions that are so 
complex or difficult to unwind that the doctrine of equitable mootness would 
apply.”228 But drawing a line somewhere between $10 and $50 million in assets 
and liabilities would produce two effects. First, it would fail to consider the 
effect on the innocent third parties equitable mootness was meant to protect.229 
An investor who invested in a reorganized small business should not receive 
less protection than one who invested in a large, publicly traded company.230 
Second, drawing a line would remove the balancing “between the equitable 
considerations of finality and good faith reliance on a judgment and the 
competing interests that underlie the right of a party to seek review of a 
bankruptcy order adversely affecting him.”231 Bankruptcy courts are courts of 
equity, and equity requires a court to look at an entire matter.232 Judge Ambro 
noted in In re Tribune Media that bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, must 
look at the “stark circumstances to grant relief.”233 Dismissing an equitable 
 
 225 Id. at 287. 
 226 Id. at 288. 
 227 Id. at 279. 
 228 Lowenschuss v. Selnick, 170 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 229 See, e.g., In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560–61, 567 (3d. Cir. 1996) (citing In re Manges, 29 F.3d 
1034, 1043 (5th Cir. 1994)); In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 777 (7th Cir. 1994) (“By protecting the interests 
of persons who acquire assets in reliance on a plan of reorganization, a court increases the price the estate can 
realize ex ante, and thus produces benefits for creditors in the aggregate.”); In re Club Assocs., 956 F.2d 1065, 
1069 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[A] number of investors, who were not parties to this case, had committed new funds 
to the ‘reemerged Club’ with the expectation of receiving a preferred return on their investments.”). 
 230 Compare In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 564 (noting the importance of the $450 million investment 
in the reorganization), with In re Club Assocs., 956 F.2d at 1069 (discussing the importance of a less than 
$500,000 investment by numerous parties to the reorganization plan). 
 231 In re Club Assocs., 956 F.2d at 1069. 
 232 See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002); In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 288 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016). While the common understanding is 
that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, this proposition is contested. See generally Ahart, A Stern 
Reminder, supra note 147, at 191; Ahart, The Limited Scope, supra note 22, at 1; Levitin, supra note 147, at 85 
(2006). 
 233 In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 288 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
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mootness argument at a certain dollar amount would violate this proposition 
because a court would no longer be looking at the matter in toto. 
The court in In re One2One implied that even though the debtor in the case 
was not as large as other debtors in Third Circuit equitable mootness 
dismissals, that fact was not dispositive.234 The reason the appeal was not 
equitably moot was because the plan did not present intricate transactions like 
issuing publicly traded securities, mergers, or changes in management that 
would make the plan difficult to retract.235 
Appellate courts should only look at “size” to determine the backdrop 
against which to proceed. The size of the debtor’s assets and liabilities is 
therefore not dispositive in a complexity analysis because courts must look at 
all aspects of a reorganization plan.236  
2. Liquidation or Reorganization: The First Roadblock to Equitable 
Mootness 
After assessing the size of the case, the next factor appellate courts should 
determine is whether the chapter 11 plan is a liquidation or reorganization 
plan.237 Appellate courts should not proceed to the doctrine’s analysis in 
liquidation plans; they should either remand or hear the appeal on its merits. 
Liquidation plans do not invoke third party reliance or a need for finality, the 
pillars upon which equitable mootness rests.  
In liquidation plans, “transactions tend to be discrete and relatively simple 
transactions aimed at disposing of the debtor’s assets in the short term.”238 
They tend to be the type of one-off transactions that bankruptcy courts can 
void.239 Despite this fact, the Second Circuit in In re BGI did not assess the 
complexity of the liquidation plan’s transactions.240  
 
 234 805 F.3d 428, 435 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 235 Id. at 436–37. 
 236 See In re Mortgs. Ltd., 771 F.3d 1211, 1215 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 237 In re BGI, Inc., 772 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Beeman v. BGI Creditors’ 
Liquidating Tr., 136 S. Ct. 155 (2015). See generally Kildonas, supra note 184, at 22. 
 238 In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 576, 588 (D. Del. 2009); see also In re Age Ref., 
Inc., 537 F. App’x 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In this liquidating plan scenario, under the particular facts of this 
case, ‘overturning the Plan’ functionally would mean no more than re-allocation of money from Chase to other 
parties in interest.”), aff’d, 801 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 239 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (citation omitted) (“Money had 
changed hands and, we are told, cannot be refunded. But why not? Reversing preferential transfers is an 
ordinary feature of bankruptcy practice, often continuing under a confirmed plan of reorganization.”); see also 
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The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal as equitably moot because the 
appellants failed to satisfy the fourth (adequate process for adversely affected 
parties) and fifth (pursuing the claims with all diligence) factors in the circuit’s 
equitable mootness analysis.241 Notably absent from the opinion was a 
discussion of the third factor regarding “intricate transactions.” Instead, the 
court relegated this discussion to a footnote, where it recognized that complex 
transactions typically do not arise in liquidation plans.242 However, the court 
still went on to hold that the appeal was equitably moot because other parties 
devoted time and energy towards developing an acceptable liquidation plan.243 
The court’s failure to look at intricate transactions represented a major point of 
departure from Second Circuit precedent and the doctrine’s foundation in In re 
Roberts Farms.244 
The decisions from some of the other circuits the court in In re BGI relied 
on also seemed to depart from the foundation in In re Roberts Farms.245 Two 
of those decisions and the transactions therein, In re Casinos, Inc. v. President 
Casinos, Inc., and Schaefer v. Superior Offshore International, Inc. (In re 
Superior Offshore International, Inc.), illustrate why equitable mootness 
should not apply to liquidation plans because of the transactions’ simplicity.246 
In President Casinos, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
found the appeal from a liquidation plan equitably moot, relying heavily on the 
fact that the plan was substantially consummated.247 The liquidation plan 
involved the liquidation of several wholly-owned subsidiaries and the principal 
 
In re Res. Tech. Corp., 430 F.3d 884, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Unscrambling a transaction 
may be difficult, but it can be done. No one (to our knowledge) thinks that an antitrust or corporate-law 
challenge to a merger becomes moot as soon as the deal is consummated. Courts can and do order divestiture 
or damages in such situations.”). 
 240 See In re BGI, 772 F.3d at 110–11. 
 241 Id. (listing cases where other circuits discussed equitable mootness in the liquidation context). 
 242 Id. at 110 n.15 (citing In re BGI, Inc., 476 B.R. 812, 825 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
 243 Id. at 110–11 (listing cases where other circuits discussed equitable mootness in the liquidation 
context). 
 244 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 
F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 245 See In re BGI, 772 F.3d at 110–11 & n.15 (2d Cir. 2014) (listing cases where other circuits discussed 
equitable mootness in the liquidation context). 
 246 See In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 576, 588 (D. Del. 2009); see also In re Age Ref., 
Inc., 537 F. App’x 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In this liquidating plan scenario, under the particular facts of this 
case, ‘overturning the Plan’ functionally would mean no more than re-allocation of money from Chase to other 
parties in interest.”), aff’d, 801 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 247 See In re Casinos, Inc. v. President Casinos, Inc., No. 4:08CV1976 CDP, 2010 WL 582794, at *7 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 16, 2010), aff’d, 409 F. App’x 31 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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company itself.248 The dispute arose because the appellant believed the 
liquidation plan improperly subordinated her rights to the holder of several 
larger claims.249 As a result, the appellant believed she received considerably 
less in the distribution than she would have otherwise.250 
The court determined the plan was substantially consummated because 
“‘the Debtors paid all non-disputed, allowed claims as provided for under the 
Plan, including the JECA claims’ on December 8, 2008 or as soon thereafter as 
was reasonably practicable.”251 It stated that other sales and distributions 
occurred that the court could not undo to reallocate the funds.252 The court 
therefore affirmed the lower court’s finding that this appeal was equitably 
moot.253 
In In re Superior Offshore, the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite result and 
held the appeal was not equitably moot because of the simplicity of the 
transactions.254 The debtor filed a plan that created a liquidation waterfall,255 
which would pay additional classes of claims and interests if the sale of assets 
produced additional proceeds.256 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit briefly addressed equitable mootness.257 The 
court determined the appellants’ complaints centered on the “specificity about 
how Class 7 and Class 8 will share in any money available for equity-level 
interests.”258 Because the issue concerned distribution allocations between 
 
 248 See Brief of Appellee President Casinos, Inc., at 6–11, In re Casinos, Inc. v. President Casinos, Inc., 
No. 4:08CV1976 CDP, 2010 WL 582794 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 10-2325), 2010 WL 3693550, at *6–
11. 
 249 See id. 
 250 See President Casinos, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12901, at *4. 
 251 Id. at *6. 
 252 Id. at *7. 
 253 Id. at *20–22. 
 254 591 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 255 “A waterfall payment is a repayment system by which senior lenders receive principal and interest 
payments from a borrower first, and subordinate lenders receive principal and interest payments after.” 
Waterfall Payment, INVESTINGANSWERS.COM, http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/debt-
bankruptcy/waterfall-payment-4618 (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). 
 256 See In re Superior Offshore, 591 F.3d at 352–53 (“[T]he Plan stated that unsecured claims (Class 5) 
would be paid first. If liquidating the intangible assets generated additional proceeds, then subordinated 
unsecured claims (Class 6) would receive value. If Class 6 received 100% of its claims, then equity interests 
(Classes 7 and 8) would receive any additional value.”). 
 257 Id. at 353–54. 
 258 Id. 
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classes, the court found that equitable mootness did not apply to this situation 
since the plan did not present transactions that would be difficult to unwind.259 
These two decisions and the simple distributions therein demonstrate why 
equitable mootness should not apply in the liquidation context. Both these 
appeals sought reallocation of funds from one class to another.260 The court in 
In re Superior Offshore correctly determined that equitable mootness was not 
intended to apply to these types of simple transactions, even upon substantial 
consummation.261 Despite the presence of similar transactions, the court in 
President Casinos dismissed the appeal as equitably moot because the 
transactions were substantially consummated.262 The appellate court’s decision 
placed far too much emphasis on substantial consummation, even though the 
transactions were one-off transactions between two parties.263 
Appellate courts have determined equitable mootness should not apply 
“when taking a payment to which one class is not contractually entitled, and 
giving it to the party contractually entitled to those funds, would not undermine 
the basis for other parties’ reliance on the finality of confirmation.”264 One 
academic noted, “[I]f an appeal simply reallocates consideration from one class 
of creditors to another, it is less likely to be equitably moot.”265 The 
transactions in liquidation plans tend to be distributions aimed at settling 
claims; the disputes that arise involve reallocating distributions from one class 
to another.266 Liquidation plans do not trigger third party reliance because the 
 
 259 Id. at 354. 
 260 See In re Casinos, Inc. v. President Casinos, Inc., No. 4:08CV1976 CDP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12901, at *18 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 16, 2010), aff’d, 409 F. App’x 31 (8th Cir. 2010); In re Superior Offshore, 591 
F.3d at 353–54. 
 261 See In re Superior Offshore, 591 F.3d at 354. 
 262 See President Casinos, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12901, at *15–17. 
 263 See id. at *17. 
 264 In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016); see In 
re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 250 (5th Cir. 2009) (remanding an issue of administrative priority claims); 
In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 265 Markell, supra note 27; see In re Age Ref., Inc., 537 F. App’x 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 801 F.3d 
530 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 266 See, e.g., SCH Corp. v. CFI Class Action Claimants, 569 F. App’x 119, 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the liquidation plan and holding the appeal was not equitably moot); In re Age Ref., 537 F. App’x 
at 398; Thurner Indus. v. Gunnison Energy Corp. (In re Riviera Drilling & Expl. Co.), 502 B.R. 863, 870 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2013) (“The rights of third parties have been affected in that creditors have received some 
minimal payment, a small receivable ($10,000) has been transferred to GEC for value, and GEC has 
committed funds to the plan administrator who has incurred administrative expense. But none of these are 
effects that could not be remedied were we to reverse the Confirmation Order.”); Appellee’s Response Brief at 
9–10, In re Centrix Fin. LLC, 355 F. App’x 199 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1266), 2009 WL 2955243, at *9–10 
(outlining the post-confirmation distributions in the liquidation plan). 
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business does not exist anymore—the debtor does not need to attract new 
investors or enter into new contracts with third parties, the individuals or 
entities equitable mootness is supposed to protect.267 “Because there is nothing 
left of [the debtor], there are no investors in a reorganized business whose 
interests would be negatively affected.”268 
Even if money is exchanged in a liquidation context, courts could reverse 
the transfer.269 In In re Resource Technology, Judge Easterbrook noted that 
undoing transactions is difficult, “but it can be done.”270 Similarly, in In re 
Kmart, the Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Easterbrook again, 
dismissed the debtor’s equitable mootness argument because the transactions at 
issue were simple cash distributions from the debtor to its pre-petition 
supplier.271 The court opined, “Money had changed hands and, we are told, 
cannot be refunded. But why not? Reversing preferential transfers is an 
ordinary feature of bankruptcy practice, often continuing under a confirmed 
plan of reorganization.”272 Reallocating one-off distributions from one party to 
another after a liquidation is a situation where courts can unwind a 
transaction.273 Courts should therefore not apply equitable mootness to 
liquidation plans. 
 
 267 See, e.g., Duff v. Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, LLC, 801 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Cont’l 
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560–61, 567 (3d. Cir. 1996) (citing In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1043 (5th Cir. 1994)); 
In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 1994) (“By protecting the interests of persons who acquire assets 
in reliance on a plan of reorganization, a court increases the price the estate can realize ex ante, and thus 
produces benefits for creditors in the aggregate.”); In re Club Assocs., 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(“[A] number of investors, who were not parties to this case, had committed new funds to the ‘reemerged 
Club’ with the expectation of receiving a preferred return on their investments.”). 
 268 Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, 801 F.3d at 840; In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (“Money had changed hands and, we are told, cannot be refunded. But why not? Reversing 
preferential transfers is an ordinary feature of bankruptcy practice, often continuing under a confirmed plan of 
reorganization.”). 
 269 See In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866 at 869 (Easterbrook, J.) (explaining that a district judge “reversed the 
order authorizing payment” to K Mart’s “critical vendors” because “neither § 105(a) nor ‘doctrine of 
necessity’ support[ed] the order”). 
 270 430 F.3d 884, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.). 
 271 359 F.3d at 869–70. Technically, Judge Easterbook only noted that the Seventh Circuit has 
“recognized the existence of a longstanding doctrine . . . .” Id. at 869. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, 801 F.3d at 840 (“[T]his plan involved distribution of cash, which is easy to 
count and value.”). 
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3. The Types of Transaction Involved in a Reorganization Plan 
After determining whether a chapter 11 plan was a reorganization or a 
liquidation plan, appellate courts should then look at the types of transactions 
involved in the plan. Transaction type is already a seminal consideration for 
appellate courts in equitable mootness appeals.274 This factor should carry the 
most weight when the plan required issuing publicly traded securities, either in 
satisfaction of claims275 or public issuances.276 
Transactions within a chapter 11 plan that involve publicly traded 
securities277 can exponentially increase the number of third parties with an 
interest in the debtor.278 While this same scenario is possible with private 
companies and non-publicly traded securities, the risk is heightened when 
reorganization plans involve publicly traded securities. If transactions 
involving publicly traded securities are present, appellate courts should 
conclude a complex reorganization occurred. If these transactions are not 
present, appellate courts must engage in a deeper analysis of the transactions. 
They must determine whether the transactions produced fundamental changes 
in the debtor, such as through a merger or changes in the debtor’s corporate 
structure. 
 
 274 See id.; see also In re Mortgs. Ltd., 771 F.3d 1211, 1215 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014); Trico II, 343 B.R. 68, 71 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 275 See In re Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 403 B.R. 300, 304–05 (D. Del. 2009) (stating that the plan provided 
for the issuance of tens of millions shares of stock to various creditor classes); In re Adelphia Commc’ns 
Corp., 367 B.R. 84, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that the plan provided that over 117 million shares of publicly 
traded stock would be distributed to over 13,500 creditors); Trico II, 343 B.R. at 71; In re Innovative Clinical 
Sols., Ltd., 302 B.R. 136, 138 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). Securities received pursuant to a Code proceeding under 
the circumstances described in § 1145(a) of the Code would not be deemed restricted securities because they 
would have been received in a “public offering” under § 1145(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a), (c) (2012). But see 
William M. Prifti, 24A SECURITIES PUB. & PRIV. OFFERINGS § 7:61 (2d ed.). 
 276 In re Spansion, Inc., Nos. 10-369, 10-385, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86152, at *15, 16 (D. Del. Aug. 4, 
2011) (noting that the plan provided for a public offering of 6.75 million shares of new common stock); In re 
Calpine Corp., 390 B.R. 508, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that the plan provided for stock of the 
reorganized debtor to be traded on the NYSE); In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 386 B.R. 518, 534–35 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that the stock appeared on the NYSE); In re Adelphia, 367 B.R. at 96–97. 
 277 A security is a financial instrument that represents an ownership position in a corporation (stock), a 
creditor relationship an entity (bond), or rights to ownership represented by an option. A security is a 
negotiable financial instrument that represents some type of financial value. Security, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/security.asp (last visited March 11, 2016). 
 278 See Trico II, 343 B.R. 68, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 770 
(7th Cir. 1994) (“By protecting the interests of persons who acquire assets in reliance on a plan of 
reorganization, a court increases the price the estate can realize ex ante, and thus produces benefits for 
creditors in the aggregate.”). 
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a. Transactions Involving Publicly Traded Securities 
An appellate court should conclude a complex reorganization occurred 
when the reorganization plan involved issuing publicly traded securities. These 
types of transactions have proven critical in determining whether a complex 
reorganization occurred in a chapter 11 reorganization plan.279 Publicly traded 
securities create heightened difficulties for an appellate court; the securities at 
issue may not be held by the same bond or stockholder that received them 
pursuant to the reorganization.280 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York determined that a complex reorganizations occurred in 
both Varde Investment Partners, L.P. v. Comair, Inc. (In re Delta Airlines, 
Inc.)281 and Salsberg v. Trico Marine Services (In re Trico Marine Services),282 
when the reorganized public debtors issued securities both in satisfaction of 
claims and in a public offering. 
In In re Delta Air Lines, the court determined a complex reorganization 
occurred in Delta’s chapter 11 case.283 The plan provided for two stock 
issuances.284 First, Comair’s unsecured creditors would receive “New Delta 
Common Stock” to satisfy their claims, valued at $800 million.285 The second 
stock issuance, a public offering on either the New York Stock Exchange or 
NASDAQ, would occur after the bankruptcy court confirmed the plan.286 
“New Delta Common Stock” appeared on the New York Stock Exchange 
three days after the effective date of the plan.287 Nearly 290 million shares of 
stock and three million stock purchase options were distributed to creditors and 
eligible employees.288 By the same date one year later, over 820 million trades 
 
 279 See, e.g., In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C), No. 13 CIV. 5755 SAS, 2014 WL 46552, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 6, 2014); In re Delta, 386 B.R. at 534–35 (finding the case equitably moot and giving heavy consideration 
to the issuance of new Delta stock on the New York Stock Exchange); Trico II, 343 B.R. at 71 (finding the 
case equitably moot because, in large part, “[i]f stock is issued under a plan to creditors in satisfaction of their 
debts, restoration of the status quo requires the reinstatement of the debts and the cancellation of the stock”). 
 280 See Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp (In re Zenith Elecs. Corp), 250 B.R. 207, 217 (D. Del. 
2000), aff’d sub nom. Nordhoff Investments, Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 281 386 B.R. 518 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 282 343 B.R. 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 283 386 B.R. at 534–35. The reorganization plan involved two entities: Delta and Comair, a regional 
airline wholly-owned by Delta. Id. at 523. 
 284 Id. at 522. 
 285 Id. at 522–23. The estimated value of the claims was later increased to $1.05 billion. Id. at 524. 
 286 Id. at 522–23; Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code at 86, In re Delta, 386 B.R. 518 (No. 1:05BK17923 4201). 
 287 In re Delta, 386 B.R. at 534. 
 288 Id. 
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had taken place involving the New Delta Common Stock.289 The court found 
that a complex reorganization took place, explaining “no one could possibly 
trace and cancel all of the trades that have taken place since the issuance of the 
stock.”290 
In re Trico Marine, a pseudo-equitable mootness decision,291 also 
demonstrated that transactions involving publicly traded securities are 
indicative of a complex reorganization.292 Under the plan, the debtor cancelled 
promissory notes with an approximate value of $275 million and initially 
issued ten million shares of “New Common Stock” to those noteholders.293 Six 
months later, the debtor issued an additional 4.273 million shares of “New 
Common Stock” through a public offering.294 The stock was actively traded 
through NASDAQ as of the date of the revocation complaint over a year 
later.295 
The court emphasized that revoking confirmation orders for plans 
involving complex transactions, such as stock issuances, is much more 
problematic than revoking plan confirmation orders generally: “If stock is 
issued under a plan to creditors in satisfaction of their debts, restoration of the 
status quo requires the reinstatement of the debts and the cancellation of the 
stock.”296 The “substantial trading activity” of the stock issued in connection 
with the plan made restoration of the pre-plan status quo untenable.297 The 
debtor’s issuance of publicly traded securities through a series of plan 
transactions transformed the debtor’s chapter 11 case into a complex 
reorganization.298 
Appellate courts have dismissed appeals in cases dealing with smaller 
monetary values. In Nordhoff Investments, Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp. (In 
re Zenith Electronics Corp.), the District Court for the District of Delaware 
found a complex reorganization occurred because of a $50 million publicly 
 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. at 535. 
 291 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 292 Trico II, 343 B.R. 68, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 293 Id. at 70. Under another provision in the plan, the holders of “Old Common Stock,” which was 
cancelled under the plan, received warrants exercisable for up to 10% of the “New Common Stock” issued 
under the plan. Id. 
 294 Id.  
 295 Id.  
 296 Id. at 71.  
 297 Id.  
 298 Id.  
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traded bond issuance.299 The debtor’s plan included, in relevant part, replacing 
bonds with an aggregate principal amount of $103.5 million with new bonds 
with a reduced aggregate principal amount of $50 million, but bearing interest 
at a slightly increased rate.300 The appellant argued that the appeal was not 
equitably moot because the value of the bonds at issue (as well as the overall 
size of the case) was much smaller than the situations in other Third Circuit 
equitable mootness dismissals.301 
While the court agreed that the case at hand was much smaller than the 
court’s previous equitable mootness applications, the court dismissed the 
appellant’s revocation complaint anyway because the transactions under the 
plan relating to the publicly traded bonds still produced a complex 
reorganization.302  
The court recognized that most of the plan’s transactions, such as the 
largest creditor’s cancellation of $200 million of debt in exchange for stock or 
another creditor’s refinancing of certain debts, could be reversed.303 The court 
found that the bonds, however, presented posed significant challenges.304 The 
bonds were publicly traded, and the court specifically noted that “the 
bondholders today may not be the same investors as the bondholders at the 
time of [the debtor’s] bankruptcy filing or the [p]lan’s confirmation.”305 The 
court determined “such ‘reversal’ would almost certainly impact the rights of 
investors that were not involved in the bankruptcy proceeding”—it would be 
too difficult to reverse the bond exchange because the bonds were publicly 
traded, which exponentially increased the number of parties with an interest in 
the debtor.306 
 
 299 250 B.R. 207, 218 (D. Del. 2000), aff’d, 258 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 300 Id. at 209 (explaining that the plan involved exchanging $103.5 million of bonds bearing interest at 
6.25% with $50 million of bonds bearing interest at 8.19%); see Brief of Appellee Zenith Elec. Corp., at 7–8, 
In re Zenith, 250 B.R. 207 (D. Del. 2000) (Nos. 00-2250, 00-2249), 2000 WL 33988513, at *7–8. The 
reorganization plan also included an exchange between the debtor and its largest creditor that would eliminate 
$200 million in debt and other liabilities in exchange for all the remaining stock in the reorganized company. 
Id. 
 301 See In re Zenith, 250 B.R. at 214.  
 302 See id. at 217; see also Nordhoff Investments, Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“Although the plan here is not as complex as the plan in Continental Airlines, it is hardly simple.”). 
 303 In re Zenith, 250 B.R. at 217. 
 304 See id. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
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Transactions involving publicly traded securities result in complex 
reorganizations because the number of third parties relying on the finality of 
the reorganization plan drastically increases.307 Courts cannot trace all of the 
transactions that occur after a party receives a publicly traded security.308 
Courts would have to track and cancel all of the trades that happened for any 
given security. Such a reversal would be unfair to all of the third parties that 
were not parties to the bankruptcy case. The court in In re Trico Marine, for 
example, recognized that no basis in law existed for it to cancel the secondary 
offering.309 
An appellate court could order those parties that sold their securities to turn 
over some or all of the proceeds to appellants, thereby providing partial 
relief.310 Judge Posner addressed this possibility in In re Envirodyne 
Industries.311 Finding that some members of a class who received stock in 
satisfaction of their claims had already sold their stock, Judge Posner posited 
that the court could order these members to turn over all or some of the 
proceeds to the appellants.312 While the Seventh Circuit ultimately did not 
reach the issue of plan modification, Judge Posner’s reasoning from In re 
Envirodyne is helpful in analyzing other cases that involve reorganized debtors 
issuing securities.313 
Judge Easterbrook recognized the negative consequences that “undoing” 
transactions involving publicly traded securities could have on a debtor’s 
survival post-bankruptcy.314 In In re UNR Industries, the court determined that 
reliance on a reorganization plan’s finality was crucial to the value of a 
reorganized debtor’s assets: 
 
 307 See In re Texaco Inc., 92 B.R. 38, 45–46 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 
769 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting how fifteen million shares of stock traded in public markets drastically increased 
the number of potential third parties). 
 308 See In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 386 B.R. 518, 535 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Zenith, 250 B.R. at 
217 (“[B]ecause the bonds are publicly traded, the bondholders today may not be the same investors as the 
bondholders at the time of Zenith’s bankruptcy filing or the Plan’s confirmation.”). 
 309 See Trico II, 343 B.R. 68, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also In re Delta, 386 B.R. at 534–35 (“No 
one could possibly trace and cancel all of the trades that have taken place since the issuance of the Stock.”); In 
re Texaco, 92 B.R. at 46–45. 
 310 See In re Envirodyne Indus., 29 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (“Some of the 14% 
noteholders, it is true, have already sold their stock, but they could be ordered to surrender some or all of the 
proceeds to the appellants.”). 
 311 See id. 
 312 See id. 
 313 See id. 
 314 In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 1994).  
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Every incremental risk of revision on appeal puts a cloud over the 
plan of reorganization, and derivatively over the assets of the 
reorganized firm. People pay less for assets that may be snatched 
back or otherwise affected by subsequent events . . . By protecting 
the interests of persons who acquire assets in reliance on a plan of 
reorganization, a court increases the price the estate can realize ex 
ante, and thus produces benefits for creditors in the aggregate.315 
Protecting innocent third parties through finality is good for debtors, creditors, 
and third parties.316 Dismissing an appellant’s appeal does substantially less 
harm than reallocating proceeds several years after the fact in situations that 
present such a delicate balancing of fairness.317 
Courts are beginning to look to whether a reorganization plan involved 
publicly traded securities as a way to limit the doctrine of equitable 
mootness.318 The lack of publicly traded securities was a major factor in the 
court’s determination that a complex reorganization had not occurred in In re 
One2One.319 Because of the potentially significant effects on third parties 
caused by issuing publicly traded securities in a reorganization plan, appellate 
courts should give this factor the most weight when determining whether a 
complex reorganization occurred. 
b. Transactions Resulting in Fundamental Changes to the Debtor 
Absent transactions involving publicly traded securities, appellate courts 
should determine whether a reorganization plan involved transactions that 
resulted in a debtor’s “comprehensive change of circumstances.”320 These types 
of transactions are most often fundamental changes to the corporate debtor, 
such as a merger of one or more entities321 or changes in the debtor’s corporate 
structure.322 The reorganization plan in Perez v. Terrestar Corp. (In re 
 
 315 Id. at 770. 
 316 See In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 289 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016). 
 317 See id. (“In very few cases, shutting an appellant out of the courthouse does substantially less harm 
than locking a debtor inside.”). 
 318 See Markell, supra note 27. 
 319 See In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 437 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 320 Chateaugay I, 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Crystal Oil Co., 854 F.2d 79, 82 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981))). 
 321 See, e.g., In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C), No. 13 CIV. 5755 SAS, 2014 WL 46552, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 6, 2014) (“The new holding companies were created, and a complex series of mergers and dissolutions 
have been consummated.”).  
 322 See In re Innovative Clinical Sols., Ltd., 302 B.R. 136, 141 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (outlining the 
changes the debtor underwent since plan confirmation). 
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Terrestar Corp.) illustrates how these changes produce a complex 
reorganization. 
In In re Terrestar, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
determined that a complex reorganization occurred, despite the absence of 
transactions involving publicly traded securities, because the debtor underwent 
fundamental changes as a result of the plan.323 The debtor’s plan of 
reorganization required: the unlisting of formerly public common shares; the 
company’s reorganization as a new, privately held corporation with new 
bylaws and a new certificate of incorporation; a merger of several of the 
debtor’s subsidiaries; and an election of all new members to the board of 
directors.324 
Turning to the third factor of the Second Circuit’s equitable mootness 
analysis, the court determined that “overturning the confirmation order would 
require vacatur of the entire plan.”325 The court found that the appellant could 
not offer a legitimate means through which the court or the corporate debtor 
could reinstate its old bylaws and certificate of incorporation.326 The 
fundamental changes the debtor went through allowed it to obtain exit 
financing and shed pre-petition liability.327 The court was not willing to undo 
those changes because reversing those fundamental changes would undermine 
the third party reliance those changes produced.328 
While a company may have the same name upon exiting chapter 11, 
mergers and other changes to the corporate structure result in a comprehensive 
change of circumstances that induce reliance by third parties, whom the 
doctrine is meant to protect.329 The entity that entered chapter 11 is 
fundamentally different than the one that that exited.330 Whereas unwinding 
transfers is a regular practice in bankruptcy, “unmerging” a debtor business 
entity would be a daunting task for an appellate court.331 Doing so would 
 
 323 No. 13 Civ. 562 (GBD), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118918, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013). 
 324 See id. at *10–12. 
 325 Id. at *14. 
 326 See id. at *15. 
 327 See id. at *15–16. 
 328 See id. at *17. 
 329 See Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 195, at 2 n.1.  
 330 See In re Innovative Clinical Sols., Ltd., 302 B.R. 136, 141 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (“In essence, old 
ICSL no longer exists.”). 
 331 See In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 250 B.R. 207, 217 (D. Del. 2000) (“[R]eversal of these transactions 
would not likely be quite as daunting a task as the ‘unmerging’ of 54 debtors . . . in Continental.”), aff’d sub 
nom. Nordhoff Investments, Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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involve returning a debtor to its pre-petition past.332 These types of 
transactions, which fundamentally change the corporate debtor, produce 
complex reorganizations. 
The types of transactions that occur under a chapter 11 reorganization plan 
will be the indicators that carry the most weight for courts when determining 
whether a complex reorganization occurred.333 Transactions involving publicly 
traded securities and transactions that result in a “comprehensive change” of 
the debtor’s circumstances are both strong indicators that a complex 
reorganization has occurred in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case.334 If the plan does 
not call for the issuance of publicly traded securities or transactions that 
fundamentally change the debtor’s corporate structure, courts should next 
determine whether a settlement agreement served as the centerpiece of the 
plan. 
4. Settlement Agreements as the Centerpiece of a Reorganization Plan 
The final factor appellate courts must assess to determine whether a 
complex reorganization occurred in a chapter 11 case is whether a settlement 
agreement served as the centerpiece of the plan. A settlement as the 
centerpiece of a reorganization plan results in a complex reorganization 
because those agreements are the result of intense, multi-party negotiations that 
redefine numerous creditors rights; they allow the debtor to enter into 
transactions with third parties who are relying on the results the settlement 
agreement produced.335 Settlement agreements operate as the driving force 
behind the plan, as was the case in In re Tribune Media336 and R<2> Invs., 
LDC v. Charter Communications, Inc. (In re Charter Communications, Inc.).337 
 
 332 See In re Terrestar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118918, at *17. 
 333 See In re Mortgs. Ltd., 771 F.3d 1211, 1215 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014); Trico II, 343 B.R. 68, 71 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 334 See Trico II, 343 B.R. at 71; In re Zenith, 250 B.R. at 217 (“[B]ecause the bonds are publicly traded, 
the bondholders today may not be the same investors as the bondholders at the time of Zenith’s bankruptcy 
filing or the Plan’s confirmation.”). 
 335 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Mal Dunn Assocs., Inc., 
406 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 336 799 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016). 
 337 691 F.3d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[R]emoving a critical piece of the Allen Settlement . . . would 
impact other terms of the agreement and throw into doubt the viability of the entire Plan.”); see also In re Mal 
Dunn Assocs., 406 B.R. at 626; In re Coll. Properties, Ltd., No. BAP AZ-07-1075-PAAK, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 
4862, at *9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2007) (holding that the SACR settlement agreement was the crux of the 
reorganization); 
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In re Tribune illustrated how a settlement agreement can operate as the 
centerpiece of a reorganization plan and result in a complex reorganization.338 
There, the debtor’s reorganization plan included a settlement of claims for 
$369 million, which resulted from the debtor’s disastrous leveraged buy-out.339 
The settlement agreement also settled claims against the debtor not tied to the 
leveraged buy-out by assigning those claims to a litigation trust that would 
continue to pursue them and pay out any proceeds according to a waterfall 
structure.340 
The Third Circuit determined that the settlement agreement was the focal 
point of the reorganization plan, emphasizing the substantial weight the 
bankruptcy court gave the agreement in confirming the plan.341 The court 
determined that the hundreds of transactions the debtor entered into post-
confirmation were done in reliance on the settlement agreement as the 
centerpiece of the plan.342 Of particular importance was the fact that the 
settlement agreement induced a large equity investment in the debtor.343 The 
court found “[t]hat investment no doubt was in reliance on the [s]ettlement.”344 
In In re Charter Communications, two provisions of the settlement 
agreement distributed consideration to a principal shareholder and allowed the 
debtor to obtain third party liability releases from other claims.345 The Second 
Circuit determined that removing these two provisions would “impact other 
terms of the agreement and throw into doubt the viability of the . . . [p]lan.”346  
 
 338 See In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 281. 
 339 Id. at 276. For a discussion of the events that led to Tribune’s bankruptcy, see generally Markell, supra 
note 27 (discussing the details of the case). “A leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition of another company 
using a significant amount of borrowed money (bonds or loans) to meet the cost of acquisition. The assets of 
the company being acquired are often used as collateral for the loans, along with the assets of the acquiring 
company.” Leveraged Buyout–LBO, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/ 
leveragedbuyout.asp (last visited March 11, 2016). 
 340 See In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 276; see also Brief for the Appellees, supra note 21, at 14 n.26. 
Aurelius, the holder of $2 billion of company’s debt, objected to the plan because it believed the settlement 
agreement was too small, but the bankruptcy court approved the plan over this objection. See In re Tribune 
Media, 799 F.3d at 276. 
 341 In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 280 (quoting In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 142 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2011)). 
 342 Id. at 280–81 (quoting In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 142). 
 343 See id. at 281. 
 344 See id. 
 345 691 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 346 Id. at 485. 
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The presence of a settlement agreement as the fulcrum greatly increases the 
complexity of a reorganization plan. The agreement becomes the vehicle that 
drives the reorganization. The agreement allows the debtor to settle claims 
with other parties and induces transactions with third parties not otherwise 
involved in the debtor’s bankruptcy case, as was the situation in In re Tribune. 
The agreement in In re Tribune induced a large equity investment and 
removing the agreement would “require returning to the drawing board,” thus 
jeopardizing the debtor’s chance at successfully reorganizing.347 Similar to 
transactions involving publicly traded securities or transactions that cause a 
comprehensive change in the debtor’s circumstances, settlement agreements 
that are central to a reorganization plan increase the number of parties with an 
interest in the reorganized debtor, producing a complex reorganization. 
An assessment of these four factors will answer the question, “Has a 
complex reorganization occurred?” Ideally, this approach will eliminate the 
doctrine’s unwarranted application to smaller, relatively simple bankruptcies 
and ensure that equitable mootness remains the exception rather than the 
rule.348 
CONCLUSION 
The future of equitable mootness is unclear. One observer noted that some 
room for the doctrine still exists, but “whether that room is a large or small . . . 
is still up for debate.”349 Judge Krause’s concurrence in In re One2One opened 
the legal community’s eyes to the doctrine’s misapplication. Moving forward, 
appellate courts must determine, as a threshold matter, whether a complex 
reorganization occurred before deciding whether to proceed to their equitable 
mootness analyses. This approach ideally will keep the doctrine limited to 
complex reorganizations. Through this Comment’s proposed four-factor 
approach, complexity will serve as the gatekeeper to equitable mootness. 
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 347 In re Tribune Media, 799 F.3d at 281. 
 348 See id. at 288 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 349 Markell, supra note 27. 
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